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We must move forward into the future.
But we can only do so by marching backwards,
so to speak, with our eyes in the past.
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INTRODUCTION
Stare decisis is much more than a rule for common-law judges. It is a
specific intellectual framework that is also essential to the practice of common-
law lawyers. It both commands and lives off of certain practices, among which
the lawyer's duty to disclose adverse precedents factors prominently. The
marriage of stare decisis with the duty to disclose precedents provides insight
into some of the most hotly debated issues in litigation, namely the use of foreign
law in adjudication and the acceptance of amicus curiae.
The relationship between stare decisis and the lawyer's duty to display all
relevant precedents to the court is also clear from a historical perspective. One
of the most significant decisions in Enqlish legal history-as much of a
watershed as Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins -came to be because of a counsel's
candor. In 1898, the House of Lords ruled in London Tramways Co. Ltd. v.
London County Council that it would refuse to review any legal question on
which it had already decided without exception-thus freezing the doctrine of
stare decisis for more than sixty years until a change in policy in 1966.4
The London Tramways rule probably would not have come into existence
if the lawyer on the losing side of the case had not alerted the court to a precedent
that foreclosed his side's success. The Earl of Halsbury, who penned the decision
that dismissed the appeal, admitted that it was "[b]y the candour of the learned
counsel who very properly raised the question in the first instance" that the
House of Lords came to realize that here was "upon this very question a decision
of this House."5 The candid counsel caused the House of Lords to drop his own
case. He lost the case for his client-a lawyer's great dread. But, far from being
an act of self-sabotage, the counsel fulfilled one of the lawyers' core duties of
conduct that guide common-law jurisdictions: disclosing to the Court previous
decisions that could influence the ruling.6
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. London Tramways Co. Ltd. v. London County Council [1898] AC 375 (HL) (appeal taken
from Eng.).
4. Practice Statement [1966] 3 All ER 77 (HL).
5. Id.
6. Hall & Co. v. Simons [2000] UKHL 38, [2002] 1 AC 16 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord
Steyn, J.) ("[N]othing should be done which might undermine the overriding duty of an advocate to the
court.").
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The importance of parties incorporating all the relevant cases within their
arguments has not subsided. A few years ago, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, in a situation where an appellant failed to address in its
reply brief a precedential case that had just been decided between the filing of
the appellant's initial brief and the appellee's response, mocked the appellant in
vitriolic terms.7 The opinion, authored by Judge Richard Posner, stated that
"[w]hen there is apparently dispositive precedent, an appellant may urge its
overruling or distinguishing or reserve a challenge to it for a petition for certiorari
[to the Supreme Court] but may not simply ignore it." 8 The court included a
photo of an ostrich with its head in the sand next to an image of a lawyer with
his head similarly in the sand, writing, "The ostrich is a noble animal, but not a
proper model for an appellate advocate."9
This Article argues that London Tramways more than a century ago and
the Seventh Circuit today were making the same crucial observation about the
expectations for legal reasoning that foster a commitment to stare decisis. In
common-law jurisdictions, consistency among cases is not just a normative
command or a cultural trend but a shared practice that informs legal reasoning
itself. To borrow from Professor Jeremy Waldron's terminology, for legal
systems that adopt stare decisis, arguments from precedent are "process-
related"10 : they "stand independently of considerations about the appropriate
outcome."'1 They matter because they inform the way the parties and the court
view the case at hand, even though the final decision may depart from them.
This Article explores how legal reasoning incorporates previous decisions.
It does so by analyzing the shared expectations of common-law jurisdictions and
contrasting them with the characteristics of the supranational European legal
order, which similarly develops through the judiciary-even though most
European countries that dhere to those courts' decisions are civil law regimes
domestically. It assumes that one shared feature of common-law jurisdictions
consists of giving adequate weight to previous decisions and building a legal
reasoning that resonates with them.
The Article analyzes this issue by examining the role that legal systems
assign to litigating attorneys and considers whether those attorneys are expected
to participate in ensuring that courts take previous decisions into consideration
before drafting new ones. To focus the analysis and substantiate it with examples
drawn from legal practice, the Article identifies the relevant rules of several
common-law jurisdictions, with a specific focus on those of England and the
United States, and highlights their strong commonalities-as evidenced by the
divergent legal practice at the supranational European legal systems. It does not
focus on whether these provisions are enforced, but rather on what they show
about the mentality of the common law. It reflects on what it should mean to
7. Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co., 662 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2011).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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think "like a lawyer"'2 from the perspective of the legal system in which lawyers
operate. The parties' duty to cite adverse authorities is particularly telling in an
age in which technology has rendered the rule itself potentially irrelevant. Online
search engines have made the rule less necessary to ensure that the court is
informed; indeed, its resilience over time should be understood in light of the
legal narrative that it helps to create.
Litigation is important for legal development in non-common-law
jurisdictions as well. Lawyers' codes of conduct, for instance, are meaningful
proxies for expectations. In Europe, supranational courts have been among the
main drivers of the development of European law, either directlyl4 or
indirectly.15 Two courts are particularly relevant: the European Court of Human
Rights ("ECtHR") and the Court of Justice of the European Union ("CJEU").
The ECtHR patrols the enforcement of the Council of Europe's Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms16 (European
Convention on Human Rights) among its forty-seven Member States. It is
considered the "de facto supreme jurisdiction over European human rights."' 7 Its
"genius" is commonly believed to be the theory of the "living instrument," by
which the Convention's meaning and scope can progressively expand to cover
more, newer circumstances.1 8 The CJEU, formerly the European Court of
Justice, is almost universally considered a main driver of European Union law.19
Both European supranational entities expound the law through their rulings.20
The types of legal reasoning that those jurisdictions produce, however, are
12. Berman, supra note 2, at 264.
13. See Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making ofa Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 1 (1981) ("[T]he [European Union's] Court has arrogated to itself the ultimate authority to
draw the line between Community law and national law.").
14. Courts have developed it directly through the doctrine of the direct effect of European law,
which the European Court of Justice introduced with the famous Van Genden Loos decision. Case 26/62,
Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands
Inland Revenue Administration 1963 E.C.R. 1 [hereinafter Van Gend en Loos).
15. A European Court of Human Rights decision only binds a Member State in that specific
case as to the party that brought the suit. It does not directly affect State laws unless each State endows
the Court's judgments with this power. Nonetheless, it is beyond doubt that several European States have
been pushed to develop their own laws in line with the ECtHR's decisions. See Janneke Gerards, The
European Court of Human Rights and the National Courts: Giving Shape to the Notion of "Shared
Responsibility, " in IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OF THE
JUDGMENTS OF THE ECTHR IN NATIONAL CASE-LAW 71 (Janneke Gerards & Joseph Eleuren eds., 2014)
("The national courts are asked to adopt the Court's autonomous and evolutive definitions of Convention
rights and apply them in their own case-law. If they do not do so, or lack the competence to set aside
national legislation, the state may be held accountable for aviolation of the Convention. By copying the
Court's interpretative approach, the national courts can avoid the occurrence of such violations.").
16. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ConventionENG.pdf.
17. Mikael Rask Madsen, The Challenging Authority ofthe European Court ofHuman Rights:
From Cold War Legal Diplomacy to the Brighton Declaration and Backlash, 79 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 141, 141 (2016).
18. Luzius Wildhaber, The European Court ofHuman Rights in Action, 21 RITZtMEIKAN L.
REV. 83, 84 (2004); see also Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 131 (1978).
19. See R. Daniel Kelemen, The Court of Justice of the European Union in the Twenty-First
Century, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 120 (2016).
20. Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 2 (1981) ("The great influence traditionally exerted on the continental judiciary by legal
doctrine has been somewhat overshadowed by the growing impact of, and respect for, the case law.").
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imperfect copies of common-law decisions.21 This issue has been present in the
22
ECtHR's rulings in particular. The ECtHR's judgments may contradict or
overlap with each other, or they may interfere with previous lines of reasoning
without providing an adequate explanation for doing so. As a result, they can
suffer from a high level of unpredictability or inconsistency.23
The Article contends that these flaws of the European supranational courts
confirm the importance of the collective obligation of parties and judges to
consider and address previous case law. This obligation is an inherent part of
stare decisis. Adherence to stare decisis is neither solely the judge's
responsibility nor exclusively dependent on whether judges themselves
understand stare decisis to be an "inexorable command."24 Although common-
law jurisdictions differ widely in their adherence to stare decisis doctrines, they
generally affirm the ethical duty to respect previous judicial decisions.
There are significant variations on the level of authority that attaches to
precedents. In American law, the extent to which precedent applies is open to
debate and change.25 The British tradition of stare decisis, which is stricter than
the American one, has also vacillated between a rigid adherence to precedents
and openly evolutionary patterns.26 Thus, the normative value of precedent in
common-law systems does not inhere simply in its binding force but more
broadly in the type of legal reasoning that it creates. A jurisdiction is not required
to adhere to an understanding of stare decisis that obliges a judge to follow all
precedents: a judge need not "follow a mistaken (to her) earlier decision solely
because of its existence"27 in order to respect precedent while expounding the
law. But the jurisdiction necessarily needs to care about previous decisions.
A thorough consideration of previous decisions also affects the scope of
jurisdiction: when courts consider precedent, they indirectly relate their legal
reasoning back to the past in a way that can also limit judicial power.28 If a court
is required to examine the past carefully, that requirement disciplines or even
constrains its capacity to innovate within the law. If a court must make judgments
21. See Takis Tridimas, Precedent and the Court of Justice: A Jurisprudence of Doubt?, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 307 (Julie Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis
eds., 2012) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHIcAL FOUNDATIONS] (noting that the Court of Justice of the European
Union does not follow common-law courts methodologically, even though it seeks guidance in its prior
decisions).
22. Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law
Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 565 (2015).
23. J. Dyson Heydon, Are Bills ofRights Necessary in Common Law Systems?, LAW Q. REV.
130, 404 (2014).
24. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ("Stare decisis is not an inexorable command;
rather, it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.")
(internal quotations omitted).
25. Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 2
(2001).
26. ROBERT STEVENS, THE ENGLISH JUDGES: THEIR ROLE IN THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION
16, 33, 53 (2005).
27. Frederick Schauer, Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere) Is Not Totally (or Even
Substantially) About Analogy, in LEGAL ARGUMENTATION THEORY: CROSS-DISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 50 (Christian Dahlmann & Eveline T. Feteris eds., 2013).
28. See Brett G. Scharffs, The Character ofLegal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733,
751 (2004) ("The law is rooted in the past through the tradition of precedent.").
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in line with precedent, it takes quite a leap to depart from it. It is not by accident,
then, that when a court respects precedent,
[t]he mere fact that a court disagrees with one of its earlier rulings is not in itself
sufficient tojustify overruling. Overruling demands special justification. There must
be a cogent reason or it must appear right to do so. Sticking to precedent is a value
in itself and there must be an interest outweighing that value to persuade the court to
overrule.29
In other words, respect for precedent does not stem merely from the
persuasiveness of earlier decisions but also from the normative value of the mere
existence of precedent.
This Article will identify the core components of common-law systems'
reliance on precedent, contrasting it with the broader legal culture concerning
precedent in European supranational jurisdictions. To provide a framework for
analysis, Part I provides a background of the European court systems. Part II
isolates three structural factors involved in the crafting ofjudicial reasoning: (a)
the structure of judicial systems, (b) courts' attempts at capping their caseload
and overruling previous decisions, and (c) the adversarial system. It then details
these factors in common law and supranational European jurisdictions and
provides an overview of the treatment of precedent in Europe.
Part m focuses on the dynamic role that lawyers play in courts' treatment
of precedent by examining lawyers' legal or ethical obligations. It describes the
duties of lawyers to provide judges with an adequate picture of previous
decisions and compares that duty with the degree to which judges adhere to
precedent in the legal system within which they operate. To that end, it focuses
primarily on the English and American systems, paying particular attention to
the American rule's history, enforcement, and role in fostering precedent-bound
judicial arguments. It argues that he American rule requiring the disclosure of
adverse precedent forces lawyers to supply judges with lines of reasoning that
take into consideration precedent, which in turn encourages judges to consider
prior decisions in their rulings. It also contends that, because this rule does not
apply to non-precedential sources, it causes British and American jurisdictions
to be skeptical of foreign cases, since parties can selectively choose those that
best serve their arguments and discard the rest. Finally, it describes the
nonexistence of any similar duty at the European supranational level.
Part IV expounds upon the benefits of the duty to disclose adverse
precedent and how it affects constitutional and statutory interpretation. It
maintains that precedent-bound reasoning provides stability and societal
acceptance without causing stagnation in the development of legal doctrine. Part
V analyzes the expansive role of amici curiae, who are not under the obligation
to disclose precedents hat run against their submissions. Their role, which is a
staple in constitutional litigation, seems to affect the spirit of common law,
regardless of their effectiveness in influencing the outcome of individual
decisions. Paradoxically, the role of amici confirms the centrality of the rule
requiring lawyers to display all precedents to the court.
29. Tridimas, supra note 21, at 312 (internal quotations omitted).
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The Article concludes that the common-law framework of legal reasoning,
by including a duty to disclose relevant precedents, forces parties to try to make
sense of them. By contrast, the European supranational systems' current lack of
legitimacy and their poor reliance on precedent are related. Considering
precedents can only be successful as part of a legal mindset shared among
participants in a controversy and which the legal system as a whole deems
necessary. It is neither a matter solely for a judge to consider nor a self-executing
logical outgrowth of judicial reasoning. It can succeed only as a deep and shared
commitment of a legal order.
I. BACKGROUND: THE EUROPEAN SYSTEMS
This Article will first provide a brief overview of the two European systems
of adjudication .in order to establish a frame of reference for how the common
law is unique.
A. The Court ofJustice of the European Union
The CJEU is widely considered the European Union's main vehicle for the
interpretation of European law. The EU can legislate in a variety of ways, and
the EU's Member States are tasked with applying their own domestic laws in
conformity with those acts and laws. The Member States' domestic courts
interpret and apply domestic law in accordance with the EU's laws for the most
part, with the CJEU having plenary jurisdiction over some limited areas.30
The CJEU considers cases concerning questions of legal interpretation,
called "preliminary rulings," and certain actions to annul EU acts that violate EU
treaties or fundamental rights in a constitutional style of review. 3 In preliminary
rulings, national courts ask the CJEU to issue an advisory opinion concernin
the implementation of EU law in a case currently in front of the national court.
A national court can ask the CJEU for those preliminary rulings only while the
case is ongoing.33 Once the CJEU provides the national court an answer to the
question of law, that court in turn considers the answer when applying the law in
the case before it.3 4 The CJEU is supposed to only provide an interpretation of
the law, not advise on its application, and it cannot order a national court to
declare its own laws invalid. National courts retain discretion in applying the
substance of the rulings, although the preliminary ruling's answer on the
question of law is binding on the referring court and subsequent actors.36 The
30. See MARGOT HORSPOOL ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW 80 (10th ed. 2018).
31. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 267, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 47.
32. HORSPOOL, supra note 30, at 81.
33. Id.
34. Id. This process is similar to how federal courts can certify questions of law to a state
supreme court that has permitted such a process. See generally Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court
Certification of Questions of State Law to State Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS.
157 (2003) (discussing federal certification, its benefits, and its detriments).
35. HORSPOOL, supra note 30, at 88.
36. Id. at 81, 98.
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preliminary ruling's answer to the legal question is considered precedent for all
national, domestic courts.37
Depending on the complexity of the issue, three, five, or fifteen judges (the
whole court) are assigned to the case.38 The CJEU then determines whether an
oral hearing is needed.39 The CJEU employs Advocates General to assist the
judges in deciding the issue.4 0 If the CJEU determines that a case is complex
enough to require an Advocate General's opinion, an Advocate General provides
an impartial, written opinion of how the CJEU should rule.4' The CJEU then
deliberates and rules on the case.
B. The European Court ofHuman Rights
The ECtHR has been called "the single most important rights-protecting
tribunal in the world."42 It is exclusively dedicated to interpreting the European
Convention on Human Rights, with which forty-seven European countries must
comply. Its decisions are binding on those countries but require State
implementation. Once the ECtHR rules on a matter, the State brought before it
is expected to rectify the issue not just for the individual case but for future cases
as well.4 3 The cases before the ECtHR mostly involve a private citizen or group
making a claim that a country-through its actions or inaction in the face of a
third party's violation of rights-violated his or her rights under the
Convention.44 The initial decision on the matter is decided by a seven-judge
panel; in exceptional circumstances, a panel of seventeen judges will review that
decision de novo.4 5 Unlike the CJEU, which considers questions in pending
cases, the ECtHR only considers a case once the entire process has completed in
domestic courts.46
The ECtHR considers itself the "conscience of Europe" and views its
Convention as a "living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of
present-day conditions."4 7 Often, the ECtHR will recognize rights when it
perceives that a consensus is growing in European domestic ourts and wants to
37. Id. at 98.
38. Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Protocol No. 3, art. 16, 2010 O.J C
83/10, https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdfl2016-08/tra-doc-en-div-c-0000-2016-
201606984-0500.pdf. Court of Justice of the European Union,.
39. Id.
40. Horspool, supra note 30, at 68.
41. Id. at 68.
42. Dia Anagnostou, Untangling the Domestic Implementation of the European Court of
Human Rights' Judgments, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Dia Anagnostou ed., 2013).
43. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PILOT JUDGMENTS (Nov. 2016),
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FSPilot judgmentsENG.pdf.
44. See, e.g., THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, YOUR APPLICATION TO THE ECHR 10
[hereinafter ECHR APPLICATION], http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Your Application ENG.pdf
(discussing suits against Member States).
45. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 16,
arts. 26, 29.
46. Anagnostou, supra note 42, at 7.
47. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.) at ¶ 71 (1995)
(preliminary
objections).
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further that consensus throughout Europe.48 It is concerned with maintaining its
effectiveness in addressing "contemporary social issues." Evolving consensus-
more than precedent-is the driving force in the ECtHR system.49 ECtHR
opinions are to the point. Unlike in common-law opinions, the ECtHR does not
engage in a rigorous analysis of prior cases, but rather cites prior cases only for
their propositions upon which the Court relies.
II. STARE DECISIS AND THE STRUCTURE OF ADJUDICATION: WHAT SHAPED
THE MODERN COMMON LAW AND HOW THE SUPRANATIONAL EUROPEAN
SYSTEMS ARE DISTINCT
Stare decisis is not self-executing. Several factors affect how adjudication
and stare decisis operate. First, this Part describes the structural components of
the common law that affect adjudication: at the broadest level, the structure of
trials and the system of appeals; at the individual court level, the way a court
caps its caseload and eparts from precedent; and at the party level, the nature of
the adversarial system. It discusses how these factors affect adjudication in the
common law. Then, this Part details the aspects, structure, and logic of
supranational European law that affect its handling of precedents, and contrasts
them with the basics of common-law regimes.
A. Structural Components that Affect Common-Law Adjudication
Three main structural components of the common law promote
consideration of precedents. What follows is therefore a description of
"constituent parts of a coherent body of knowledge about law, and in that sense
[of] elements of a legal science as well as a legal method."5 0 These are the logical
prerequisites for the functioning of stare decisis.
1. The Structure of Trials and the Appeals System
The structure of trials and the appeals system plays a special role in a
common-law court's attention to precedent. As Neil Duxbury has stressed, that
a suit is initiated with a complaint is a key factor in framing the whole process
of adjudication: because a complaint is put forward before the litigation begins,
parties are forced to stay within the four corners of it.5 Duxbury argues that this
practice of asserting preliminary claims made the entire system of English stare
48. See, e.g., Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand
Chamber) ¶ 74 ("While the Court is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments, it is in the
interests of legal certainty, foreseeability, and equality before the law that it should not depart, without
good reason, from precedents . . . . However, since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the
protection of human rights, the Court must have regard to the changing conditions within the respondent
State and within Contracting States generally and respond. . .to any evolving convergence .....
49. Id.
50. Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science:
From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 440 (1996) (including in the list the "doctrine of precedent,
forms of action, legal fictions, jury trial, rights of the accused, the adversary system, evidence, [and]
treatises").
51. NEIL DuxBuRY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 25 (2008).
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decisis possible52 because it narrowed the scope of the whole trial. It forced the
judge to ascertain whether the complaint fell within the scope of precedent and
required both the litigants and the courts to focus on the existing case law on the
subject instead of allowing later compromises to alter the cause of action itself.53
The common-law system's understanding of the role of judges in relation
to juries is also crucial. From the United States' founding until the early
nineteenth century, questions of law were deferred to juries in most trials.54 Since
"each judge was free to state to the jury his opinion of the law and each jury was
free to select the opinion it preferred," the "adherence to past precedents was at
best fortuitous, and legal certainty and predictability were unobtainable."ss It was
only when judges started controlling legal determinations that it became possible
to avoid conflicting legal decisions on the same subjects.56
Another basic feature of systems that allow for case law consistency
through time is the capacity to record and transmit authorities.57 For centuries,
English common law suffered from a near complete unavailability of records of
previous decisions, which made it impossible to locate the relevant body of law
58
and thus gave the judge substantial liberty in ruling. Access to judicial
decisions may be taken for granted now since technology enables lawyers and
judges to find them relatively easily-today, sorting through cases is often more
difficult than finding them. But in those earlier times, stare decisis was stymied
by judges' inability to access previous decisions.5 9
Finally, the common-law system of appeals is conducive to maintaining
stare decisis. At a minimum, a structured appellate system with a clear hierarchy
of appeals is needed to secure vertical stare decisis. The vertical dimension of
precedent tends to bind lower courts to higher courts' decisions simply because
lower court decisions that do not respect high courts' interpretations of the law
run a high risk of being overturned on appeal.
2. Caseload and Departures from Precedent
A clear system of appeals is not enough to guarantee the consistency of
case law. Capping the caseload is key. The Anglo-American system of appeals
5 2. Id.
53. Id. ("A consequence of this development was that judges began more regularly to produce
reasoned decisions rather than merely steer parties towards agreement on what should be pleaded.").
54. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, 21, 165-68 (1994).
5 5. Id.
56. John H. Langbein, Bifurcation and the Bench: The Influence of the Jury on English
Conceptions ofthe Judiciary, in JUDGES AND JUDGING IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL
LAW: FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES, 67, 70, 79 (Paul Brand & Joshua Getzler eds., 2012)
[hereinafter JUDGES AND JUDGING].
57. JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 80 (1968).
58. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER W. BROOKS, LAWYERS, LITIGATION AND ENGLISH SOCIETY SINCE
1450,204 (1998).
59. DAWSON, supra note 57, at 80.
60. RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 7 (4' ed. 1991).
61. See RAIMO SILTALA, A THEORY OF PRECEDENT: FROM ANALYTICAL POSITIVISM TO A
POST-ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 81 (2000) ("A vast overload of cases .. .will make it extremely
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protects higher courts from an excessive caseload by allowing them to control
their docket. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in the vast majority of cases
chooses which cases to hear. Meanwhile, the U.K. Supreme Court has recently
issued a Practice Direction in which it allows appeals that ask "the Supreme
Court to depart from one of its own decisions or from one made by the House of
Lords"62 only "for applications that ... raise an arguable point of law of general
public importance which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court at that
time, bearing in mind that the matter will already have been the subject ofjudicial
decision and may have already been reviewed on appeal."6  An excessive
caseload is detrimental to a sound policy of stare decisis and even an ordered
schema of previous decisions itself.
3. The Adversarial System
The adversarial system plays a role in shaping common-law courts'
reliance on precedents and their resilience to change. If, as John Finnis has put
it, "[a]djudication is the effort to identify the rights of the contending parties now
by identifying what were, in law, the rights and wrongs, or validity or invalidity,
of their actions and transactions when entered upon and done,"" then the
adversarial nature of common-law adjudication is essential to its structure. That
adversarial structure by necessity slows down the rate of legal change because it
focuses on the law at the time that past actions occurred while at the same time
shaping the legal expectations of non-parties going forward.
B. Structural Components that Affect Supranational European Systems
Supranational European law has a different approach to those three
components of the common law-the trials and appeals system, caseload
management, and the adversarial system-that contributes to the differences
between the two systems.
1. The Structure ofAdjudication and the Appeals System
The CJEU and ECtHR have novel adjudicatory structures that have
historically caused issues in determining how to handle cases. Cases receive
disparate development based on domestic law before the case appears at the
CJEU or ECtHR. Relatively recently, the European Union and the ECtHR have
streamlined cases by enabling the courts to focus especially on those cases that
raise new legal issues or reveal that the existing case law should ,be reconsidered.
The CJEU, while broadly welcoming applications, has expressed its reluctance
difficult for judges to master the totality of cases, and inconsistent and even contradictory court decisions
are likely to emerge from such a flood of cases.").
62. Practice Direction [2018] UKSC 3, ¶ 3.1.3(a), https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/practice-
direction-03.pdf.
63. Id ¶ 3.3.3.
64. John Finnis, Adjudication and Legal Change, reprinted in IV PHILOSOPHY OF LAW:
COLLECTED ESSAYS 399 (2011).
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to address identical issues multiple times6 5 and provides for simplified
procedures when a case raises no new legal issues.66 These developments bring
them more in line with their Anglo-American counterparts, but the ECtHR and
the CJEU diverge from each other with respect to their treatment of precedent.
Both have historically suffered from difficulties managing precedent, and
only relatively recently have addressed, to varying degrees of success, their
burgeoning caseload. The issues of capping its workload and controlling its
docket have been particularly urgent for the ECtHR, which, as a result of its fame
as the supreme protector of human rights, has been strained under the weight of
several thousand applications.67 Many states, such as Italy, cause a number of
clone cases because they do not comply with previous judgments.6 This
noncompliance prompts applicants to file new applications before the ECtHR
69
about already-decided issues, which the State has failed to broadly remedy. In
response to this issue, the ECtHR itself has crafted the "pilot-judgment"
procedure, which identifies Convention violations that derive from structural
problems within a State and "impos[es] an obligation on [the] State[] to address
those problems."7 0 This procedure thereby encourages the State to adjust their
laws in order to avoid more condemnations from the ECtHR. Finally, the
Convention's original text was amended in 2004 to enable smaller panels of
judges to deny applications that are clearly inadmissible.7 ' While this change has
no role in disincentivizing applications, it eases the ECtHR's work.72
2. Caseload and Departures from Precedent
The aforementioned changes have not completely resolved the ECtHR's
difficulties. A court's degree of adherence to precedent plays a crucial part in
65. Joined Cases 28,29, 30/62, Da Costa en Schaake N.V., Jacob Meijer N.V., Hoechst-Holland
N.V. v. Nederlandse Belastingadministratie, 1963 Ea.C.R. 31.
66. Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, supra note 38, art. 20. The provisions
allow the Court to decline the involvement of the Advocate-General, who normally "acting with complete
impartiality and independence [makes], in open court, reasoned submissions on certain cases brought
before the General Court in order to assist the General Court in the performance of its task." Id. art. 49.
On the avoidance of the Advocate-General's intervention in the hearing, see also Practice Directions to
Parties Concerning Cases Brought Before the Court, 2014 O.J. (L31/1), art. 44 [hereinafter Practice
Directions], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014Q0131(01)&from=
EN. Moreover, in the context of the preliminary ruling procedure, see Rules of Procedure of the Court of
Justice, 2012 O.J. L265/1, art. 99 [hereinafter CJEU Rules of Procedure], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012Q0929(01)&from=EN.
67. See Hellen Keller et al., Debating the Future ofthe European Court ofHuman Rights after
the Interlaken Conference: Two Innovative Proposals, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1025, 1025 (2010) ("The flood
of applications lodged in Strasbourg threatens to clog the Court to the point of asphyxiation. . . ."); Mikael
Rask Madsen, The Challenging Authority ofthe European Court ofHuman Rights: From Cold War Legal
Diplomacy to the Brighton Declaration and Backlash, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 142 (2016).
68. See COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
TRIBUNALS: THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE 122 (2014) (discussing noncompliance issues in general and
stating that "98 percent of Italian cases pending compliance were clone cases" in 2011).
69. Id.
70. PILOT JUDGMENTS, supra note 43, at 1.
71. COUNCiL OF EUROPE, PROTOCOL 14 TO THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, AMENDING THE CONTROL SYSTEM OF THE CONVENTION (2004),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/LibraryCollectionP14_ETS 1 94EENG.pdf.
72. HILLEBRECHT, supra note 68, at 153-54.
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either inviting more applications and, hence, increasing its caseload or
disincentivizing them and limiting its caseload. A great likelihood that a court
will rely on its previous decisions hardly invites appeals from plaintiffs who hope
to win with arguments that have already lost. More broadly, adherence imposes
a clear burden on the party seeking change to demonstrate its necessity, as the
U.K. Practice Direction shows.73 Conversely, the ECtHR's "living instrument"
theory seems to attract applications, as individuals and groups have greater
reason to hope that the court will change its position.
Alasdair Mowbray has identified three patterns of change in the ECtHR
case law, two of which seem to support this conclusion.74 In addition to when
the ECtHR updates its case law in order to clarify it and make it more uniform, 7
the Court also departs from its previous decisions when: (a) under the "living
instrument" doctrine, socio-legal developments within the ECtHR's Member
States and worldwide have conferred a new meaning on the text, as discussed
above;76 or (b) there is a sizeable increase in the number of applications that
target a certain type of State conduct, persuading the ECtHR that there is a
77
widespread perception that a human right has been violated. In the latter case,
the ECtHR proclaims that there has been a human rights violation in the hope
that its condemnation will force the State to change its policy, thereby curbing
78
applications on that issue.
Like the ECtHR, the CJEU's level of deference to its previous rulings is
not particularly high, for two main reasons. First, its "lack of discursive
reasoning, which is typically present in individual judgments of Anglo-Saxon
courts, makes it more difficult for the Court to engage in detailed discussion of
its previous judgments."79 Second, the CJEU, given its civil law background,
normally avoids explicitly overruling previous decisions.80
Still, the CJEU profits from two aspects of its jurisprudence that provide it
with at least some degree of consistency in its case law: its "preliminary ruling"
mechanism, described above, by which a domestic court can refer a case to it
before applying EU laws, and its control over the development of EU law.8 1
Since the CJEU's preliminary ruling guides a domestic court before it applies
EU law, the ruling functions as precedent for the domestic case at hand. Because
the domestic court itself requests the CJEU's input, the CJEU can expect that the
domestic court will respect its decision and apply its interpretation of that law.82
Furthermore, since the CJEU's goal is the ordered development of EU law, it has
73. Practice Direction, supra note 62.
74. Michal Balcerzak, The Doctrine ofPrecedent in the International Court ofJustice and the
European Court ofHuman Rights, 27 POLISH Y.B. INT'L L. 131, 133 (2004).
75. Alastair Mowbray, An Examination ofthe European Court ofHuman Rights'Approach to
Overruling its Previous Case Law, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 181 (2009) (describing this approach).
76. Id at 193.
77. Id. at 191.
78. Id.
79. Tridimas, supra note 21, at 315.
80. Id. at 320.
81. Id. at 308 (maintaining that the CJEU would be methodologically distant from Anglo-
American courts but equivalent in the result of its rulings).
82. ROBERT LECOURT, L'EUROPE DES JUGES 233 (2008).
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been constantly aware of its pivotal role in expanding and deepening the
European integration process. This understanding has prompted the CJEU to
keep a measured pace in developing its jurisprudence after a thorough
consideration of its case law.84 The CJEU is thus better able to maintain control
over its caseload and its precedent.
3. The Inquisitorial System
The absence of an adversarial scenario may shift the focus of the
proceedings. At the ECtHR, as discussed above, the defendant is always a
Member State, which can be sued for allegedly harming or failing to protect a
person's or group's rights.85 The applicant can bring a case against the State even
if a third party infringed his or her rights, and the State simply failed to provide
redress afterwards. Similarly, the CJEU's preliminary ruling mechanism, by
which domestic courts can request that the CJEU interpret the EU law that they
need to apply, is "characterised by the absence of adversarial proceedings,"87
since the European Union's Advocate General advises the judges on how to rule
in light of the EU's interest on an impartial and independent ground.8 As such,
the focus in both courts is not so much on what the law is, but rather what the
law should be in order to further the two courts' teleological aims.
III. STARE DECISIS AND LEGAL REASONING
As the aforementioned Part shows, how the structure of trials, the judicial
system, and the prevailing legal doctrine affect a court's approach to previous
judgments varies. But differences in these structural factors, while important
contributors to a system's overall functioning, do not explain the distance
between common-law reasoning and that of the supranational European systems.
This is apparent even in comparing the two supranational European systems to
each other. Although the CJEU and the ECtHR share some structural
similarities-such as the lack of a thorough adversarial system, a weaker
tradition of following precedents, and a tendency to interpret law
83. See id. at 237; George Letsas, Harmonic Law: The Case against Pluralism, in
PHILosOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 21, at 82 (stating that included among the claims of supremacy
that the European Court of Justice has made is "that it has ultimate authority to decide all matters of
European law," and noting that the Member States have never challenged this claim).
84. See J.H.H. Weiler, Deciphering the Political and Legal DNA of European Integration, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 21, at 137, 150-151 (Julie Dickson & Pavios Eleftheriadis eds.,
2012).
85. See, e.g., EHCR APPLICATION, supra note 44, at 3-9 (discussing the procedure to sue in the
European Court of Human Rights).
86. See, e.g., Daniel Augenstein & Lukasz Dziedzic, State Obligations to Regulate and
Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the European Convention of Human Rights, 6 (European Univ.
Institute Dep't of Law, Working Paper No. 2017/15) (Even in cases concerning "'violations'.. . of human
rights by non-state actors," a State's positive obligations require it "to ensure the effective realisation of
human rights even in the face of events for which they do not bear direct responsibility.").
87. Practice Directions, supra note 66, art. 9.
88. Carl Baudenbacher, Judicial Globalization: New Development or Old Wine in New Bottles?,
38 TEXAS INT'L L. REV. 505, 524 (2003).
89. PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXTS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 62 (2011).
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progressively-their eputations are rather different: the ECtHR is criticized for
being fairly unpredictable,90 whereas the CJEU is respected as being rather
deferential towards its own precedents9 1 and by one metric enjoys Europeans'
highest support compared to other EU institutions and sometimes even domestic
institutions.92
Still, one crucial distinction exists between the European systems and the
common law: both European courts seem to pay little attention to how they
explain why they depart from previous decisions. The oft-cited reason for this
difference is that they derive their understanding of adjudication from civil law
systems.9 4 But that answer proves insufficient. It may be true that European
supranational law was founded with continental legal concepts according to
which previous decisions are not, technically, authorities.9 5 Yet this initial
founding fails to explain why these supranational courts have not clarified how
they deal with their precedent more recently. Despite the courts' authoritative
status,9 6 there seems to be no definitive explanation as to why they have not
found an asset in the Anglo-American tradition of precedents and the importance
that it attaches to previous decisions. A mere reference to history, then, is
insufficient.
This Article contends that pan-European courts do not treat precedents as
authorities because they do not share common-law courts' pattern of legal
reasoning. This explanation starts with the different duties that legal practitioners
have in these jurisdictions. In European courts, lawyers may craft arguments in
which precedents play a much smaller role than they do in common-law courts.
The practitioners' arguments in turn are reflected in the reasons that the
European judges give for their decisions, which may quote precedent selectively
because the intellectual framework they operate within does not expect them to
address all of the authorities on the subject.
Hence, the ECtHR and the CJEU may fail to fully exploit the potential of
a precedent-based form of argument because the type of reasoning presented
orally and in written pleadings allows them to do so. Practicing lawyers in
Europe have no ethical or legal obligation to build their reasoning upon
precedent as do their British and American colleagues.9 7 This lack of duty
parallels judges' lack of logical obligation to expound law considering their own
prior judgments. Conversely, in jurisdictions that give a special weight to the
duty to disclose precedents, "the parties, any appellate court and the wider
90. See Heydon, supra note 23, at 399.
91. See CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 60, at 17.
92. Kelemen, supra note 19, at 123.
93. See CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 60, at 17 ("Although the Court often explicitly follows
one of its previous rulings, it does not discuss them in an analytical way.").
94. As for the CJEU, see id. at 17 (describing the CJEU's creation).
95. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION OF THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 48 (1969) (stating that in civil law traditions
"judicial decisions are not a source of law").
96. This seems to reflect the overall approach among European domestic courts. See Hall & Co.
v. Simons, [2000] UKHL 38 (Lord Steyn, J.) (recognizing that "in the field of criminal procedure the role
of a judge in England is far more passive than in European Union countries").
97. CJEU Rules of Procedure, supra note 66, art. 99.
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community, will be concerned to know why a judge has reached a particular
decision and to assess for themselves whether the reasoning is the most cogent
according to law and not arbitrary."9 8 If parties are forced to provide a full
landscape of previous decisions, the most likely way in which courts will ensure
that "they have not been let down by incorrect judicial reasoning" is by
navigating the precedents that have been quoted.9 9 This difference is more than
a structural one for which other structural changes can compensate. Instead, it is
a core value upon which the entire system of law is based.
An analysis of common-law jurisdictions' codes of conduct and court rules
on the subject elucidates how this difference affects legal reasoning. Section
III.A describes common-law jurisdictions' ethics rules, focusing on the
American rule, and their relationship with stare decisis. Section III.B discusses
how this relationship between the ethics rules and precedent strengthens further
and discourages the incorporation of foreign decisions into common-law
reasoning. Section HI.C describes how the absence of precedent-bound
reasoning in supranational European law affects it and details how the different
levels of respect of precedent in common law and supranational European law
combine with the practice of interpreting statutes and constitutions.
A. Common-Law Jurisdictions
Common-law jurisdictions often have provisions describing the duty to cite
precedent. The Conduct Rules for the English Bar are quite strict in requiring
that barristers "take reasonable steps to ensure that the court has before it all
relevant decisions and legislative provisions.' 0 Less demandingly, the
American rules generally expect that attorneys disclose controlling legal
authority that is directly adverse to their client's position unless the opposing
party already has cited it.'01 Analogously, the Australian Solicitors Conduct
Rules require that the attorney "inform the court of any persuasive authority
against the client's case."10 2 The Federation of Law Societies of Canada's Model
Code of Professional Conduct sanctions the practicing lawyer who "deliberately
98. B.V. Harris, The Continuing Struggle with the Nuanced Obligation on Judges to Provide
Reasons for Their Decisions, 132 LAW Q. REv. 216, 217 (2016).
99. Id. at 219.
100. BAR STANDARDS BOARD, HANDBOOK r. C3.4 (2d ed. 2016),
https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1 813606/bsb handbook_13_december 2016.pdf(Eng.).
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015). The American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct have been adopted in almost every state. State
Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, (AM. BAR ASS'N 2019), http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/modelrules of professionalconduct/
alpha list state-adoptingmodel rules.html (last visited March 29, 2019). The United States' federal
structure permits different requirements among the states in practice, however, as the Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers notes: "A barrister in Britain may be subject to more stringent requirements. In
the other direction, the California regulations . .. go no further than prohibiting knowing misstatements
of law and legal materials." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 111 (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997). This Article focuses on the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct because of its near-universal adoption, although differences among the states expose the state
bars' potentially divergent understandings of stare decisis and legal ethics.
102. LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, AUSTRALIAN SOLICITORS CONDUCT RULES r. 17.2.3 (2015),
https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/files/web-pdflAusSolicitorsConductRules.pdf.
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refrain[s] from informing a tribunal of any binding authority that the lawyer
considers to be directly on point and that has not been mentioned by another
party."l 03 The New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Act Rules 2008 specify
that a lawyer's "duty to the court includes a duty to put all relevant and
significant law known to the lawyer before the court, whether this material
supports the client's case or not." 104 The Code of Conduct for the Bar of Ireland
mandates that
[i]n a civil case Barristers must, at the appropriate time in the proceedings, inform
the court of any relevant decision on a point of law and, in particular, of any binding
authority or of any applicable legislation of which they are aware and which the
105
Barrister believes to be in point whether it be for or against their contention.
These succinct provisions have implications that go beyond the mere
burden of providing the court with the information needed to make an informed
judgment. After all, the digitization of the legal profession has made this rule
technically superfluous, as many search engines now provide the parties and the
court relatively easy access to precedents. But this rule still seems to bear
significance for legal reasoning. If lawyers are expected to provide courts with
information about previous decisions, the courts are in turn expected to provide
reasons for their judgments in line with those decisions. Since "[i]t is a basic
principle of the administration of justice that like cases should be decided
alike,"l 06 if a party discusses a previous judgment, a judge will hardly ignore it
when making his or her judgment. Common-law judges thus will normally
consider previous decisions in their lines of reasoning. The parties and the judge
may determine that some judgment is not relevant and distinguish them from the
case at hand-after all, "lawyers can (and lawyers did) distinguish cases not
congenial to their argument rather than submit to an unwelcome earlier
decision."l07 But they still need to address the prior case in order to distinguish
it.
1. A Focus on the American Rule
An in-depth examination of the American rule confirms its importance not
just for the legal profession or the development of precedent, but for the legal
reasoning that governs the entire adjudication process. The rule, part of
American law for over a century, encourages courts to engage in precedent-
bound reasoning by forcing lawyers to incorporate directly adverse precedents
into their arguments.
103. FEDERATION OF LAW SOCIETIES OF CANADA, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT r.
5.1-2(i) (2016), http://flsc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Model-Code-as-amended-march-2016-FIN
AL.pdf.
104. LAWYERS AND CONVEYANCERS ACT (LAWYERS: CONDUCT AND CLIENT CARE) RULES r.
13.11 (2008) http://www.legislation.govt.nz/regulation/public/2008/0214/latest/DLM1437953.html.
105. BAR OF IRELAND, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE BAR OF IRELAND r. 5.8 (2016).
106. CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 60, at 3.
107. Ian Williams, Early-Modern Judges and the Practice of Precedent, in JUDGES AND
JUDGING, supra note 56, at 52.
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a. The Rule's History and Current Status
Some iteration of this rule has been a part of the American tradition in
codified form since the nineteenth century. A similar rule was part of the very
first codification of ethics codes in the United States, the Alabama Code of Ethics
of 1887, which proscribed "[k]nowingly citing as authority an overruled case"
and "knowingly misquoting the language of a decision."10 8 The Alabama Code,
and hence this rule, became the basis for the American Bar Association's (ABA)
ethics rules.10 9
As one commentator has noted, the ABA's position on disclosing legal
authority has vacillated between a mere prohibition against misleading the court
to a sweeping requirement to disclose any cases a judge may deem relevant
before formally settling on its current "middle ground." 110 Building from the
Alabama code, the ABA's Canons of Professional Ethics, promulgated in 1908,
stated that a lawyer must not "cite as authority a decision that has been
overruled." 11 The ABA in 1935 took the additional step of requiring disclosure
of adverse cases, regardless of whether they were precedential.11 In 1949, it
further enhanced this duty to disclose cases in its Formal Opinion 280, in which
it set out a number of questions a lawyer should consider when determining
whether to alert the court to a case.113 These included whether "the court should
clearly consider" the case "in deciding" it, whether a "reasonable judge" would
think that a lawyer who failed to disclose it was "lacking in candor and fairness,"
and whether "the judge [would] consider himself misled by an implied
representation that the lawyer knew of no adverse authority." 114 This heightened
duty was diminished in 1969 when the ABA adopted the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, which required a lawyer to disclose adverse legal
authority that opposing counsel failed to cite. 15 While since 1969 lawyers have
been bound to a lower standard than the apex of Formal Opinion 280, some
judges and authorities still cite it as a valid schema for a lawyer to use in
determining whether a case should be cited.1 16
108. CODE OF ETHICS OF THE ALA. STATE BAR Ass'N r. 5 (1887), reprinted in ALA. STATE BAR
ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ALABAMA STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION 336 (1918).
109. See Christopher W. Deering, Candor Toward the Tribunal: Should an Attorney Sacrifice
Truth and Integrity for the Sake of the Client?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 59, 67-68 (1997).
110. Thomas Spahn, Lawyers' Duties to Advise the Courts of Adverse Facts and Law,
EXPERIENCE, Summer 2010, at 46--47.
111. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS § 22 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1908).
112. See Deering, supra note 109, at 69.
113. See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Resp., Formal Op. 280 (1949);
FUNDAMENTALS OF LMGATION PRACTICE § 28.2 (2018) (discussing ABA Opinion 280).
114. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Resp, supra note 113. Or, Geoffrey Hazard and
W. William Hodes have an easy rule for lawyers: "[T]he more unhappy a lawyer is that he found an
adverse precedent, the clearer it is that he must reveal it." Wayne Schiess, Ethical Legal Lawyering, 21
REV. LITIG. 527, 532 (2002) (quoting GEOFFREY HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3.3:206 (2d ed. 1990)).
115. See JOHN H. TINNEY & ROBERT A. LOCKHART, The Duty of Candor: Where Were the
Lawyers and Why Didn't They Come Forward?, 14 E. MIN. L. FOUND. § 1.02 (1993).
116. See Elaine Bucklo, The Temptation Not to DiscloseAdverseAuthority, LMG., Winter 2014,
at 26 (discussing Formal Opinion 280 as a means for lawyers to determine whether they should disclose
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Under the current ABA Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 3.3, a
lawyer "shall not knowingly .. . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in
the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the
position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel."1 17 The failure to
cite adverse authority "may have the same effect as a misstatement of the law,""1 8
and the mere citation of an adverse case without elaboration is insufficient.119
The general understanding is that "directly adverse" means "all decisions with
holdings directly on point, but ... does not include dicta." 2 0 Distinguishing the
holding from dicta narrows the universe of cases that must be disclosed. While
it may behoove parties to cite dicta for its persuasive value, parties do not need
to address every case on point to adhere to their ethical obligations because dicta
lack authoritative weight.121
In addition to this ethics rule, in federal appeals cases Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 28 ingrains the precedent-bound nature of legal thinking by
requiring appellants to provide their "contentions and the reasons for them, with
citations to the authorities . . . on which the appellant relies."1 2 2 When parties
have not complied with this rule, appellate courts have considered arguments
abandoned on appeal.123 These two rules work together to encourage the citation
a case and citing a 2001 case that referred to the Opinion in sanctioning attorneys for nondisclosure).
117. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015). In addition to their
formal adoption by 50 American jurisdictions (including the U.S. Virgin Islands and Washington, D.C.),
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have persuasive force in other legal opinions. For example, in
Elder v. Holloway, the Supreme Court cited the disclosure rule concerning legal authority in overruling a
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case. 510 U.S. 510 (1994). In that case, the Ninth
Circuit had held that it must disregard a case unconsidered by the district court in determining whether a
right was "clearly established" for purposes of determining a government actor's qualified immunity. Id.
at 514. A unanimous Supreme Court disagreed, citing Model Rule 3.3's requirement o alert the court of
adverse legal authority to show that the Ninth Circuit's rule caused issues in light of this ethical obligation.
Id at 515 n.3. Further, some courts have interpreted the two federal rules concerning sanctions, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, to incorporate this duty, although
other courts have said otherwise. See Daisy Hurst Floyd, Candor Versus Advocacy: Courts' Use of
Sanctions to Enforce the Duty of candor toward the Tribunal, 29 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1065 (1995)
(discussing the Ninth Circuit's rejection of this interpretation of Rule 11).
118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 111 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
119. Douglas R. Richmond, Appellate Ethics: Truth, Criticism, and Consequences, 23 REV.
LITIG. 301, 323 (2004) [hereinafter Richmond, Appellate Ethics]. This disclosure is not enough partly
because "[c]ourts rely on counsel to supply most legal argument. Conscientious though judges and their
law clerks may be, it is unreasonable to rely on them to scour every cited case for issues or points relevant
to the dispute at hand." Id.
120. §llIcmt.c.
121. See Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why it Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
219, 223 (2010) (discussing the distinction between holding and dicta).
122. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A).
123. See Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 285 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[Appellant] offers no case law in
support of her claim that the district court improperly granted the defendant a directed verdict. The failure
to cite cases in support of an argument waives the issue on appeal, despite counsel's contentions at oral
argument that case law is unnecessary 'window dressing."'); see also Ball v. City of Indianapolis, 760
F.3d 636, 645 (7th Cir. 2014) ("But beyond noting the uncertainty in Indiana law, Ball has devoted no
more than three sentences to her argument, and has cited no authority to support . .. [her claim]. In this
regard, she has not complied with her obligations under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8)(A),
and has waived any contention that the district court erred with respect to her state constitutional claims.");
Projects Mgmt. Co. v. Dyncorp Int'l LLC, 734 F.3d 366, 376 (4th Cir. 2013) ("In any event, by failing to
support its contentions with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which [it] relies,
[Appellant] has waived this argument.") (internal quotations omitted); Pignanelli v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No.
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of authorities in parties' briefs.
If a lawyer fails in his or her duty to disclose directly adverse precedent,
punishments may vary. Historically, courts have rarely found a rule violation for
non-disclosure,1 24 yet the judiciary now seems to be more inclined to mention or
act on ethical violations than in prior times.125 While there may not be much
more than a symbolic sanction attached to this rule, practitioners' commentaries
stress that lawyers may suffer reputational damage if they violate it,126 and a
judge may be more skeptical of a lawyer's pleadings when adverse precedent is
undisclosed.127 The reputational damage and judges' skepticism of those
pleadings confirm that the disclosure rule is connected to the very essence of the
common law. Lawyers who fail to abide by this rule run afoul of the basic
premises of stare decisis to such an extent that judges do not give them full
credit.128
60, 540 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2008) ("Because [Appellant] has not directed us to any legal authority
or record evidence supporting a claim for relief.. . her appeal on this ground must fail.").
124. See Susan J. Irion, How to Deal like a Professional with Adverse Legal Authority, 37 LITIG.,
Winter 2011, at 49 ("[A] violation for non-disclosure does not occur with great frequency.").
125. See Francis C. DeLaurentis, When Ethical Worlds Collide: Teaching Novice Legal Writers
to Balance the Duties of Zealous Advocacy and Candor to the Tribunal, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 18 (2014).
The increased willingness for courts to chastise lawyers for failing to cite cases may be a result of what
Lawrence Duncan MacLachlan predicted: "[t]he minimum standards of professional competence . .. rise
with the increased availability of this information." Lawrence Duncan MacLachlan, Gandy Dancers on
the Web: How the Internet has Raised the Bar on Lawyers' Professional Responsibility to Research and
Know the Law, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 607, 607 (2000). As online legal databases like Westlaw and
LexisNexis become more refined, lawyers can find more relevant cases and read them more easily. This
process decreases the potential that lawyers would inadvertently miss relevant adverse precedent, although
it simultaneously increases the likelihood that a lawyer may not have the time to complete a thorough
examination of all non-binding cases from sister jurisdictions. Courts have exacted a number of different
punishments for non-disclosure, from requiring lawyers to write letters describing why they did not cite
the rule, to upbraiding lawyers harshly in opinions, to reversing a prior decision based on that non-
disclosure and awarding the opposing party's legal fees. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co.,
662 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2011) (castigating a party for not addressing adverse precedent that the opposing
counsel already cited); Irion, supra note 124, at 54-55 (summarizing punishments). Courts have issued
particularly stinging rebukes and punishments in cases where the attorney or law firm was part of the
litigation that originated the directly adverse precedent. Douglas R. Richmond, The Ethics of Zealous
Advocacy: Civility, Candor and Parlor Tricks, 34 TEX. TECH L. REv. 3, 43-45 (2002) (citing Forum v.
Boca Burger, Inc., 788 So. 2d 1055, 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)). Judges seem reluctant to impose
harsh sanctions on attorneys who violate the rule in other cases since the lawyer's incompetence, and not
his or her ethical obfuscation, could be to blame for the failure to cite adverse legal authority. See, e.g.,
Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Guthrie, 1990 WL 205945 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1990) (offering a rebuke rather than a
sanction for failing to cite adverse precedent). While a court may decline to impose sanctions for violating
this rule, surely a court's rebuke that "[w]e will assume counsel's glaring omission is the result of sloppy
research and writing, and not an intentional effort to mislead or misdirect this Court" is almost just as bad.
Id. at *2.
126. See, e.g., Richmond, Appellate Ethics, supra note 119, at 324 ("Failing to reveal adverse
authority destroys judicial trust.").
127. See, e.g., Irion, supra note 124, at 49 ("Surely, the more a court realizes it can rely on an
attorney to be fair and accurate, the more likely the attorney's arguments will carry weight. A court's
confidence in an attorney could give the client the benefit of the doubt in close situations. Or a court may
be more inclined to helpfulness toward a litigant whose counsel forthrightly disclosed adverse authority.").
128. See, e.g., id. ("Your objective in every argument ... is to show yourself worthy of trust.")
(quoting JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF
PERSUADING JUDGES xxiii (2008)).
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b. The Rule's Influence on Stare Decisis
The precedent disclosure rule "is perhaps the clearest example of a
lawyer's role as an officer of the court rather than solely an advocate for a
client." 129 Its official commentary implicates this role: it states that the rule's
"underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine
the legal premises properly applicable to the case."l30 As one commentator has
noted, "[i]mplicit in that statement is the notion that counsel should also address
how the court should treat the authority."'31 Practitioners have criticized this
concept for arguably being in tension with the lawyer's "zealous advoca[cy]" 132
on behalf of a client.133 The rule ensures that the court is at least aware of the
cases that may preclude or restrict a particular outcome, even though it does not
require parties to cite every case. It thus provides that lawyers are participants in
the proper administration of justice.
The marriage of lawyers' dual roles-officer of the court and zealous
advocate-means that a lawyer's success as an advocate is bound with his or her
protection of precedent. The practical consequences of placing zealous advocacy
above the duty to disclose directly adverse precedent profoundly harm the
lawyer's case in court.134
In harmonizing lawyers' duty to their clients with their duty to alert the
court to precedent, this rule helps promote the court's application of stare
129. AM. BAR ASS'N, LAWYER LAW § 5.9.A (2007). See Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on
Zealous Representation in an Adversarial System, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 724-25 (1997)
(discussing how the balance of interests between erroneous decisions and attorneys' duty to their client
weighs in favor of disclosure); Deering, supra note 109, at 64-66 (discussing how, while the image of the
lawyer as "hired gun" is often promoted, the characterization as an officer of the court implies a "special
duty" that "at least implicitly[] elevates the interests of the judicial system above those of the client or the
attorney"); Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REv. 39 (1989) (describing
how the understanding of lawyers as officers of the court affects their rules of professional responsibility).
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015). The ABA has also
stated that the continuing duty to disclose applies throughout the entire case, even after a decision has
been rendered on that issue. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Informal Op. 1505 (1984).
Other reasoning for the rule includes that "the purpose of litigation is to promote justice and truth(,] ...
litigation is not a game, and . . . justice is promoted" by this obligation. J. Michael Medina, Ethical
Concerns in CivilAppellate Advocacy, 43 S.W. L.J. 677,708 (1989).
131. Irion, supra note 124, at 50.
132. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) (stating that a
lawyer must act "with zeal in advocacy on the client's behalf"); see also Risa B. Lischkoff, Recent
Decisions on Citing Authorities to Courts: Model Rule 3.3(A) (3) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 19 J. LEGAL PROF. 315, 315 (1994) (discussing how lawyers may not want to give their research
to the court, thereby aiding an opponent who has not been similarly diligent in searching for cases on
point).
133. The same holds true in English courts: the English Court of Appeal dealt with advocates'
dual duties of loyalty towards the court and the client and considered the perils of granting the advocate
immunity against suits brought by clients, conclusively confirming the "overriding duty of an advocate to
the court." Hall & Co. v. Simons, [2000] UKHL 38, [2002] 1 AC 615 (appeal taken from Eng.).
134. See Richmond, Appellate Ethics, supra note 119, at 324-25 ("It is also possible that a
lawyer's failure to reveal directly adverse authority will enhance that authority in the court's eyes, for if
it was inapposite or erroneously decided, the lawyer surely would have revealed it."); Sanford Hausler,




0316-young-lawyers-corner-what-do-about-adverse-precedent/ (discussing the requirement of candor to
the courts); DeLaurentis, supra note 125, at 18 (discussing how to teach this ethical requirement among
others).
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decisis.'35 The lawyer's task is to "acknowledge and address the competing
considerations" in a case so that the court may make a precedent-bound
decision.136 The lawyer's success is bound up in alerting the court to the
proposition that opposes his or her position and distinguishing it, rather than
merely making an oblique reference to it. Hence the lawyer by necessity must
make his or her analysis case-bound.
Parties' framing of the issues and incorporation of directly adverse
precedent are vital for stare decisis because a court uses parties' pleadings as the
starting point for analysis and should consider their concerns. The rule requires
that the lawyer "recognize the conflict and suggest how it might be resolved in
such a way that his client prevails."1 37 In doing so, the lawyer provides the court
with his or her strongest argument for how a judge may work within the bounds
of precedent to reach the proper result. The judge then is provided with at least
two'3 8  reasoned alternatives-from both the plaintiffs and defendant's
counsel-for engaging in precedent-bound decision-making. In reviewing
lawyers' arguments, as Geoffrey Hazard has stated, "the court must acknowledge
that the authorities are in conflict or that there is an unresolved question of legal
policy at issue. In other words, to make a rational choice among legal alternatives
presuppose[s] a recognition that there are alternatives." 3 9 The judge need not
analyze precedent sua sponte but is provided the logical conclusions of
precedent-bound argument by the parties themselves. The parties thus promote
stare decisis by explaining how their position comports with or deviates from
prior case law.
In addition to guiding judges through reasoning that incorporates adverse
precedent, the rule encourages them to grapple with cases whose propositions
differ from that of one party. Because a judge has been alerted to directly adverse
cases, in rendering a decision the judge must confront these cases and similarly
engage in rigorous legal analysis of their facts and holdings. A decision must
provide a reasoned argument, even if merely in a footnote, as to why that adverse
precedent does or does not apply to the case before it.
135. Although most articles and commentaries decline to address this rule in stare decisis terms,
at least one other commentator has recognized how the doctrine of stare decisis promulgates this rule.
Angelica Gilmore, Self-Inflicted Wounds: TheDuty to Disclose Damaging Legal Authority, 43 CLEV. STA.
L. REV. 303, 307-09 (1995) ("An advocate's duty to disclose directly adverse legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction under Rule 3.3(a)(3) seems to be an outgrowth of the drafters' commitment to the
principle of stare decisis."). Indeed, even court opinions addressing this issue rarely relate it to stare
decisis. A thorough search has produced only one case, subsequently cited by other courts, that explicitly
draws the connection between the lawyer's duty and stare decisis, and does so in a footnote:
While good faith efforts to distinguish a situation from those in which the law is well settled
and efforts to evolve the law based on reason and experience are appreciated, attempts to
blindside the Court through failure to bring relevant, binding, and instructive authority to the
Court's attention are injurious to the administration of stare decisis.
Fieldturf Inc. v. Sw. Recreational Indust., 212 F.R.D. 341, 344 n.3 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
136. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Arguing the Law: The Advocate's Duty and Opportunity, 16 GA.
L. REV. 821, 828 (1982).
137. Id. at 830.
138. Of course, lawyers may provide alternative ways of understanding precedent in their own
briefs, and litigation often concerns more than two parties.
139. Hazard, supra note 136, at 830.
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Since the rule requires lawyers to alert judges to directly adverse cases and
causes them to provide judges with ways to incorporate those cases into their
reasoning, it facilitates courts' analysis of those cases. The court's decision will
not merely acknowledge differing cases. Instead, it will use the lines of reasoning
within them, generally fleshing out how a precedential rule applies to different
facts and developing the precedent by showing the extent to which it applies to
a new circumstance. If a court decides to deviate from the adverse authority, it
must provide compelling reasons for doing so in order to retain legitimacy and
avoid overruling.
The disclosure of precedential adverse authority also aids stare decisis by
requiring lawyers to cite cases regardless of the time they were decided. Lawyers
must cite directly adverse cases even when they are "stale": "the mere passage
of time does not transform directly adverse authority into something else and
thus excuse lack of disclosure to the court."1 4 0 Because of this rule, a court will
be confronted with the precedential cases that the lawyers cite even when they
seem from a different legal era. There is no expiration date after which a court
can discard old opinions. In fact, the strength of some precedent grows with the
passage of time depending on how many times it has been cited or implicitly
relied upon.
Some courts have interpreted the definition of "directly adverse" in a way
that encourages tare decisis more broadly, especially when there is less case law
on point. While the rule technically only addresses vertical stare decisis issues,
U.S. courts have criticized lawyers for declining to cite substantially similar
cases from other district courts or other circuits, which are not binding on the
court.141
Furthermore, some courts still encourage lawyers to follow ABA Formal
Opinion 280, which advises that, "[w]here the question is a new or novel one,
such as the constitutionality or construction of a statute, on -which there is a
dearth of authority, the lawyer's duty may be broader." 4 2 Although a lawyer on
the face of the rule is not required to take into consideration the law as it
percolates among sister courts and appellate courts outside the jurisdiction in
which the case applies, those courts have interpreted the rule as requiring a
140. Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities ofLaw Firm Associates, 45 BRANDEIS
L.J. 199, 236 (2007).
141. See CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHiCS § 5:23 (2d ed. 2015) (describing the range of requirements
courts have for disclosure-from informing the court of "significant developments in the law" to
prohibiting the citation of unpublished cases); J. Lyn Entrikin Goeming, Legal Fiction of the
"Unpublished" Kind: The Surreal Paradox ofNo-Citation Rules and the Ethical Duty ofCandor, 1 SETON
HALL CIR. REv. 27 (2005) (discussing how prohibitions on citation to unpublished opinions affect this
duty); Richmond, Appellate Ethics, supra note 119, at 319 (stating that lawyers "may be required to cite
trial court decisions . . . , a lower-court opinion even if it is on appeal, so long as the applicable law
provides that the decision has value as precedent pending appeal . .. ,or unpublished decisions" unless
doing so is "prohibited(,]" and further noting that, under a lawyer's general duty of candor, a lawyer who
has cited outside precedent o support his or her point may be held to correspondingly cite any precedent
that cuts against the argument); Richard Silverman, Is New Jersey's Heightened Duty of Candor Too
Much of a Good Thing?, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 951, 955 (2007) (mentioning cases that chastise
attorneys for failing to provide adverse precedent from other circuits).
142. Irion, supra note 124, at 51 (quoting ABA Comm. on Prof I Ethics and Grievances, Formal
Op. 280 (1949)).
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certain harmonization of the law through the citation of similar, nonbinding
cases.
Overall, the adversarial nature of common-law proceedings does not allow
parties to hide authorities that are potentially relevant; on the contrary, it forces
parties to make sense of authorities that either contradict or weaken their
allegations. All of these requirements build the foundations upon which a court
can provide an in-depth analysis of prior decisions and determine where
precedents fit within them.
B. The Intellectual Framework of Common-Law Lawyers and
Comparative Law
In a digital age, the obligation to disclose adverse authorities may seem
superfluous-after all, a court now can find precedent itself relatively easily. On
the contrary, it remains relevant because it encodes the expectation that all parties
provide narratives of the existing authorities. By imposing a duty on parties to
cite precedential cases, common-law jurisdictions force judges to pay close
attention to those precedents in legal reasoning. This attention preserves stare
decisis as being at the "heart of common law legal method"143 while nurturing a
specific type of legal reasoning. "[L]awyers and judges refer to the things they
cite as authorities"144 because they frame and guide their lines of reasoning. 145
What they cite matters not solely because of what they say but mostly because
of where they come from.146
The importance of this issue is seen in the debate about the legitimacy of
comparative law arguments in courts. To argue for the use of comparative law
in American courts, Vicki Jackson has evoked the adversarial logic that governs
common-law trials. She has stated that, since for American judges "the
'adversary' system assumes that judges can be informed-at least in part-about
issues with which the judge is not otherwise familiar through briefing by well-
,,147
trained advocates, parties can legitimately exploit foreign law in their
arguments. In actuality, the practice is problematic precisely because the
adversarial nature of the trial-and a lawyer's duty to be a "zealous advocate"
for his or her client-is not counterbalanced by the lawyers' duty to quote all
relevant decisions when they draw from foreign law.
This point was recently emphasized by U.K. Supreme Court Justice Lady
Hale, who touched upon the problems of indulging in comparative law inquiries
from the bench. She noted that, while "it would be foolish not to look at" other
countries, difficulties arise in determining what foreign laws say "in a reliable
143. Harris, supra note 98, at 223.
144. Frederick Schauer, Authority andAuthorities, 94 VA. L. REV 1931, 1934 (2008).
145. Id. at 1939 ("[W]hen a source is authoritative it provides a potentially determinative reason
for a decision other than the decision that the subject might have made after taking into account all of the
knowledge, wisdom, and information she can obtain from herself or others.").
146. Id. at 1936.
147. Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutionalism, Legal Education, and Civic Attitudes:
Reflections in Response to Professors Krotoszynski and Law, 66 ALA. L. REv. 155, 157 (2014).
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way."1 48 In fact, Lady Hale continued, "[i]n our adversarial system, we cannot
always rely upon the parties to do this. They may not have the resources and,
even if they do, they may tend to concentrate on the material which helps their
case."l49 She showed particular concern that the sources of knowledge for
foreign law may be unreliable,5 o as each party would focus on the foreign case
law that helps it the most while ignoring, or even hiding, the rest. 15 Parties could
use foreign law in a way that they are prohibited from using domestic law.
Lady Hale's preoccupation draws from the English code of conduct: no
specific provision would require English barristers to disclose the weaknesses in
their arguments by pointing to adverse decisions that were delivered in other
jurisdictions. While there is "stringent professional discipline in matters of
ethics," which allows courts to "rely on members of the bar to inform them fully
and fairly of all legal authorities (statute or case-law) bearing on a point in issue
between parties,"l52 the lack of a corresponding duty for foreign sources allows
lawyers to easily hide or misrepresent foreign precedents. English judges, then,
would bear the burden of exploring foreign precedents more accurately-but
"the court has no duty to decide any matters not in issue, or to inform itself
independently about the law governing them." 53
As Patrick Glenu famously put it, foreign case law can offer persuasive
authority, which has no normative authority but can still convince a court
because of the soundness of its reasoning.1 54 But, that is all. This different status
of foreign decisions singles them out from the authorities that common-law
lawyers are expected to share with the judge.
There is therefore a striking parallel between the different statuses of
domestic and foreign case law within common-law lawyers' codes of conduct
and the different statuses of these two categories within judges' legal reasoning,
in Lady Hale's words. Domestic precedents are incorporated into judicial
reasoning because they are authorities that bind judges and lawyers alike. If
foreign cases are incorporated into the reasoning of the parties or of the judges,
it is only because they are persuasive. And persuasion is viewed with
circumspection, as it may have the power to alter the strict normative logic of
domestic precedents.
Persuasive arguments work well as outcome-driven arguments. Parties and
courts may be inclined to use them because they believe that such arguments
could shed light on the case at issue. Conversely, arguments from domestic
precedent are process-related. They are necessary to process the case,
independent from the result that follows from them.





152. Zenon Bankowski & D. Neil McCormick, Statutes Interpretation in the United Kingdom, in
INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 359,401 (D. Neil McCormick & Robert S. Summers
eds., 1991).
153. Id.
154. H. Patrick Glenu, Persuasive Authority, 32 McGiLLL. J. 261, 263-264 (1987).
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The adversarial system, which causes judges to rely on parties' pleadings,
obligates parties to take advantage of narratives that best support their
arguments. The possibility that lawyers may cherry-pick'55 the domestic
decisions they prefer is mitigated by the duty to cite the relevant authorities and
the attendant need to construe a narrative that takes them into account. Foreign
law is technically not authoritative and is thus susceptible to outcome-oriented
selectivity. Therefore, it is a cause of controversy.
C. Supranational European Law and Lawyers
1. Supranational Lawyers and Supranational Procedure
In supranational European law, there is quite a different approach to
precedent. This is no surprise. Transnational legal practice at large is unfamiliar
with this concept. Both the Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal
Profession and the Code of Conduct for European Lawyers are silent on this
matter. The Charter is a transnational document and its values are shared by the
professional guilds of lawyers of forty-five European states;' the Code is a
binding document for all European lawyers in their transnational activities.1
Both prohibit lawyers from misleading judges and providing them with false
information, but are silent on precedents.158
Of course, the two aforementioned documents do not apply to the CJEU
and the ECtHR, per se, as they target transnational egal practice, while the CJEU
and the ECtHR fall within the spectrum of international law.1 59 But the rules
governing litigation before the CJEU and the ECtHR provide a specific approach
to litigation, compared to that of common-law courts, and certainly do not deal
with how lawyers should treat precedent.
There is no specific set of rules for lawyers practicing at either the CJEU
or the ECtHR, nor is there a clear indication of what their role is with regard to
the client and the judges. Legal scholarship is also of little help here, as interest
in professional ethics for lawyers practicing in those courts has grown only
recently.160 The CJEU's and the ECtHR's rules of procedure only require that
the parties submit the relevant facts and the "reasons"i16 of action or the
155. On the legal concept of "cherry-picking," see Martin Gelter & Mathias M. Siems, Citations
to Foreign Courts-Illegitimate and Superfluous, or Unavoidable? Evidence from Europe, 62 AM. J.
COMP. L. 35, 40 (2014).
156. Who We Are, THE COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUROPE,
www.ccbe.eu/about/who-we-are (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
157. Id.
158. THE COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUROPE, CHARTER OF CORE PRINCIPLES OF
THE EUROPEAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN LAWYERS, Principle (i)
& art. 4.4 (2013), http://www.ccbe.eu/NTCdocument/ENCCBE CoCpdfI1382973057.pdf.
159. Arman Sarvarian, Common Ethical Standards for Counsel before the European Court of
Justice and European Court ofHuman Rights, 23 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 991, 999 (2012).
160. Id at 991-992.
161. CJEU Rules of Procedure, supra note 74, art. 94; RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS Rule 41 (1993); see also RULES OF COURT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS Rule 50 (2016) [hereinafter RULES OF COURT], http://www.echr.coe.int
/Documents/RulesCourt eng.pdf.
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"arguments."'62 Arguments may of course include previous judgments, but there
is no requirement o do so. The rules of procedure's silence on precedents echoes
the practice of most of their Member States' domestic regimes. As the English
Court of Appeal has recognized, "[flor example, in Germany there is apparently
no duty to refer the court to adverse authorities as in England."1 63
The rules and practices of the CJEU and the ECtHR can, however, shed
some light on what they expect from lawyers. From the time that it was the Court
of Justice of the Coal and Steel Community and the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, the CJEU has inherited many of the rules that govern
the procedure of the International Court of Justice.164 Its proceedings consist of
a written part and an oral part.165 The oral part starts with the reading of a
summary of written pleadings by the Judge Rapporteur, whom the CJEU assigns
to handle the case.166 The report then provides the CJEU and the parties with a
concise recapitulation of the submissions of the parties as well as the facts.167
At the CJEU, the oral pleadings tend to be as succinct as possible. It has
become customary to hand out the Judge Rapporteur's summary to the parties
instead of reading it aloud, and the advocates are advised to restrain their oral
pleadings to a limited amount of time, 8 around fifteen minutes normally.169
This basically means that the legal arguments need to be fully articulated within
the written pleading, which now is limited to twenty pages maximum,
170 and that
there is very little time for litigants to argue orally about the applicability of
precedents to the case at hand. Such brevity of written and oral submissions may
have affected the lawyers' focus on precedent, forcing them to be selective rather
than exhaustive in their analysis of the existing case law.
Confidentiality also seems to have affected the role of precedents in the
CJEU's legal reasoning. Until the current Rules of Procedure allowed anyone to
consult the CJEU register that keeps all the relevant documents of a case,
"[t]he practice of the European Court of Justice [was] to treat as confidential the
text of the written observations of the parties, unless the latter expressly consent
to their disclosure."1 72 This means that, notwithstanding the overwhelming
importance of written submissions for the case in comparison with the oral
162. Practice Directions, supra note 66, arts. 1 & 12.
163. Hall & Co. v. Simons, supra note 7.
164. Richard Plender, Rules ofProcedure in the International Court and the European Court, 2
EUR. J. INT'L. L 1, 1 (1991).
165. Id. at 12.
166. Id.
167. Id
168. Id at 21; see Practical Guidance for Advocates Before the Court of Justice in Preliminary




169. CJEU Rules of Procedure, supra note 74, art. 44; see Practice Directions, supra note 66, arts.
44 & 52.
170. Id.
171. CJEU Rules of Procedure, supra note 74, art. 22.
172. Hall & Co. v. Simons, supra note 7.
172. Plender, supra note 164, at 21-22.
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pleadings, the audience and future litigants were likely to know only the
summary that the Judge Rapporteur made at the oral pleading and the parts that
the Advocate General found relevant while drafting his or her opinion.173 The
opacity of the proceedings must have also affected the transparency of how the
CJEU navigates its case law, at least until the confidentiality rule was removed.
The distinct typology of the CJEU's proceedings has also created a group
of lawyers with a particular style of litigation. There is no single, unified body
of lawyers practicing at the CJEU, since lawyers litigating at the CJEU simply
need to be qualified to practice before a court of a member State or of a member
of the European Economic Area, whose territories cover the European Union and
also Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.174 The European Union, however, has
helped to create a common mentality across EU domestic jurisdictions. This
happened from the very beginning, as lawyers and other experts in legal matters
played a crucial role in conceiving and expounding the founding Treaties that
later culminated in the EU.1 7 5 Moreover, "[t]he [CJEU], along with other EU
institutions, actively cultivated and supported the training of networks of national
judges committed to European law who might send them cases through the
preliminary ruling procedure."l76
All in all, the type of lawyers who litigate before the CJEU tend not to
provide the judges with good, consistent, and comprehensive analysis of the
existing precedent. Their role, however, coheres with the logic and dynamics of
the CJEU itself. Its judges' scope of inquiry is not confined to the parties'
allegations, as the CJEU's procedure follows an inquisitorial and not
adversarial77 system.7 8 Moreover, through a written opinion, the Advocate
General feeds the CJEU with facts and legal reflections pursuant to the European
Union's interest in the outcome.179 Within this framework, the parties do not
need to assist the CJEU the way common-law lawyers are supposed to assist
common-law courts.
The ECtHR shares many similarities with the CJEU. While the ECtHR
does not have any office similar to the CJEU's Advocate General, a Judge
Rapporteur shepherds the case proceeding, similar to what happens within the
CJEU. 1o All documents filed to the Registry of the ECtHR are available to the
public.' 8' Lawyers can practice as long as they are qualified in "any of the
173. Id. at 22; see CJEU Rules of Procedure, supra note 74, art. 59.
174. CJEU Rules of Procedure, supra note 74, art. 44; see Practice Directions, supra note 66, art.
44.
175. Antonin Cohen, Constitutionalism Without Constitution: Transnational Elites Between
Political Mobilization and Legal Expertise in the Making of a Constitution for Europe (1940s -1960s), 32
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 109, 111 (2007).
176. R. Daniel Kelemen, The Court of Justice of the European Union in the Twenty-First
Century, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 134 (2016).
177. Practice Directions, supra note 66, art. 9 (emphasizing that the "written part of the procedure
in preliminary rulings is characterized by the absence of adversarial proceedings").
178. Id.
179. Baudenbacher, supra note 88, at 524.
180. RULES OF COURT, supra note 161, Rule 49(2).
181. Id. Rule 33(2).
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Contracting Parties and resident in the territory of one of them."l82 This openness
means that the pool of lawyers is very rich and as diverse as the practices of the
State members.
The ECtHR's subject matter has provided a special type of litigation and
inflated the ECtHR's docket beyond its capacity.s Since the ECtHR deals with
human rights issues, lawyers frame their applications in human rights terms;
thus, many legal cases are transformed into human rights disputes. The success
of this transformation in turn has expanded the scope of the ECtHR's docket,1 84
making its case law less manageable.
4. The Supranational Culture ofPrecedent
If parties have no duty to mention all previous decisions in their
submissions, judges will have more leeway in framing their arguments. This is
reflected in the "very free style of interpretation of the [CJEU]." 8 5 In ruling, they
likely will cite the decisions that fit with their line of reasoning and conclusions,
possibly consider the judgments that parties have mentioned, and be able to
disregard controversial precedents that parties may have overlooked.
Conversely, in common-law systems, parties are supposed to cite all relevant
precedents and expect that judges will consider them in their judgment.
Therefore, they are likely to develop narratives that include all the precedents
that they are required to mention, while providing arguments for the irrelevancy
of others. Judges will hardly avoid discussing controversial decisions, as parties
have not just mentioned them but also tried to make sense of them.
In Europe, the outcome of a case is not constrained by previous case law.
Departures from it are not understood as controversial ruptures but rather as
legitimate exercises of judicial review. For example, the CJEU makes choices
among possible interpretations of the law according to the probable effect they
would have on European integration instead of trying to achieve simple
consistency with previous case law.186 More generally, the absence of the
obligation to consider previous rulings thoroughly is closely linked to the court's
practice to look more prospectively while judging. Supranational European
courts lack clear threads of case law not because they are taciturn. Actually, they
write a lot.1 87 The ECtHR quotes itself multiple times188 and the CJEU develops
its legal doctrine through the Advocate General's rich opinions.89 In fact,
continental European legal culture has primed itself for constant modernization
182. Id. Rule 36(a). The President of the Chamber, however, can dispense with such requisites.
183. HILLEBRECHT, supra note 68, at 151.
184. Id. at 150-51.
185. Claus Gulmann, Methods of Interpretation of the European Court of Justice, 24
SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 187, 190 (1980).
186. Morten Rasmussen, The Origins ofa Legal Revolution - The Early History ofthe European
Court ofJustice, 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 77 (2008) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Origins].
187. Heydon, supra note 23, at 407 ("[T]he judgments lack reasoning. The judgments are long
and earnest.").
188. Balcerzak, supra note 74, at 139.
189. Nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretation at the European Court ofJustice, 20 FORDHAM INT'L.
L.J. 656, 664 (1997).
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and a purpose-oriented legal approach. The ECtHR's "living instrument" theory,
as described above, has tried to ensure that the ECtHR acts with a progressive
spirit to keep pace with cultural and legal developments worldwide m a way
that is largely unknown to English common-law judges.
The disparity between European and common-law approaches can be seen
in the ECtHR's effects on British common law. The United Kingdom provided
for a moderate integration of the ECtHR's case law into British law through the
adoption of the Human Rights Act in 1998, which requires domestic courts to
consider ECtHR case law when deciding a case involving rights under the
Convention.19 1 This modest integration has increased the activism of the British
judiciary's approach to human rights cases.1 92
From its inception, meanwhile, the CJEU has maintained a teleological line
of reasoning in its judgments,'9 3 adopting "a particular legal thinking about the
constitutional nature of the ECJ developed during the 1950s [that] was shared by
a number of important actors in the field of European law."194 This approach was
much more oriented toward the future than to the past. It was preoccupied with
the likely effects of a judgment for the sake of legal integration among EU
members rather than with its coherence with the existing case-law.195
Admittedly, once the teleological approach was explicated, the decisions of the
Court became, on the whole, consistent, principled, and "highly predictable."1 9 6
IV. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND JUDICIAL
PRECEDENT
Common law and pan-European patterns of statutory and constitutional
interpretation provide additional evidence about the different logic that governs
the development of the law in these two regimes and the role that precedents play
in it. Pan-European jurisdictions are much more progress-oriented and have
crafted modes of interpretation that start with the text but do not confine
themselves to it.
Differences inhere in how broadly common-law jurisdictions interpret
statutes. Anglo-American courts tend to interpret statutes relatively narrowly and
start by examining the literal meaning of the words themselves.197 Yet, even with
190. Paul Mahoney, The Relationship Between the Strasbourg Court and the National Courts,
130 LAW Q. REV. 568, 568 (2014). On the progressive spirit that overwhelms international legal
scholarship, see Jochen von Bernstorff, International Legal Scholarship as a Cooling Medium in
International Law and Politics, 25 EUR. J. INT'L L. 977, 978 (2014).
191. Human Rights Act 1998, c.42 (Eng.).
192. Mark Elliott, Beyond the European Convention: Human Rights and the Common Law, 68
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 85, 107 (2015) ("The [Human Rights Act] has regularized a relatively bold
approach to human rights adjudication, and has provided a convenient response to charges of judicial
overreach.").
193. Morten Rasmussen, Rewriting the History ofEuropean Public Law: The New Contribution
ofHistorians, 28 AM. U. INT'L. REv. 1187,1206 (2013).
194. Rasmussen, Origins, supra note 144, at 97.
195. Fennelly, supra note 189, at 667.
196. J.H.H. Weiler, The Court ofJustice on Trial, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 555, 573 (1987)
[hereinafter Weiler, Court ofJustice].
197. Sir Philip Sales & Richard Ekins, Rights-Consistent Interpretation and the Human Rights
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this shared commitment to studying the text, there are various approaches to
statutory interpretation in common-law systems. English courts until recently
clearly preferred focusing on the plain meaning of the text rather than the
198
political will of its drafters. They therefore lack an extensive tradition of
interpreting statutes in light of any original intent. Meanwhile, American legal
theory sees a conflict between its text-bound theories: textualists rely on the plain
meaning of the text,'99 intentionalists focus on the intentions of the Congress that
enacted it, 200 and purposivists attempt to extrapolate and further the text's
purpose.201 These many strands of interpretation can be in tension with some
proponents of stare decisis, who would prefer not to alter the law as settled by
the relevant precedents even if these modes of interpretation would lead to a
different result.202
Many of these dynamics are missing in Europe. Supranational European
courts decline to explore the original intent of the text's drafters, as evidenced
by decisions disregarding the clear meaning of the relevant treaty.203 This non-
use is outside the norm for international law. Usually in international law the
official working papers from the drafting of international documents, the travaux
prdparatoires, have a special status for the interpretation of documents. In fact,
the meta-treaty that often governs the background principles for the
interpretation of international documents, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT), requires that courts interpret ambiguous treaty texts in
204
accordance with the travaux prdparatoires. Yet, until recently, the CJEU
could not even reference its travaux prdparatoires because they were
unavailable.2 0 5 Meanwhile, the ECtHR clearly departed from the VCLT in
declining to interpret the Convention in accordance with the meaning that it had
Act 1998, 127 LAW Q. REV. 217, 221 (2011) ("The object of statutory interpretation ... is the meaning
the legislature intended to convey in enacting the statutory text.").
198. This remained the case until Pepper v. Hart, which changed the law and allowed the
examination of legislative history to ascertain the will of the legislature. Pepper v. Hart [1992] UKHL 3,
[1993] AC 593.
199. Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005).
200. James J. Brudney, Intentionalism's Revival, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1001 (2007).
201. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113 (2011).
202. See, e.g., M. Stokes Paulsen, The Text, the Whole Text, and Nothing but the Text, So Help
Me God: Un-Writing Amar's Unwritten Constitution, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1389, 1407 (2014) ("[I]f
precedent is already consistent with the written Constitution, the precedent adds nothing new to analysis
of the Constitution. . . . [T]he rest of it is improper - If precedent is inconsistent with the written
Constitution, following precedent is unfaithful to the Constitution."); see also Christopher Serkin &
Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special, 101 CORNELL L. REv. 701, 739-740 (2016) (discussing
constitutional interpretation).
203. For example, when considering the Van Genden Loos decision, which revolutionized then-
European Economic Community law by recognizing the doctrine of direct effect of European law,
"[cilearly no one would suggest that the decision of the Court was legally compelled by the language of
the Treaty. Even the Advocate General held, in the circumstances of this case, that direct effect should
not be given." Weiler, Court ofJustice, supra note 196, at 571.
204. Article 31 commands that a treaty be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning; when
necessary, according to Article 32, the "preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its
conclusion" is a "supplementary means of interpretation." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
205. Fennelly, supra note 189, at 666; Gulmann, supra note 185, at 199.
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when it was drafted.20 6 European courts fail to cultivate an interest in textualist
modes of interpretation to compensate for their lack of interest in precedent.
Within European legal culture, the text itself is not a solid anchor for
interpretation. The ECtHR reads the Convention's provisions in light of
"present-day conditions."2 07 Former ECtHR Judge Lech Garlicki candidly
acknowledged that, under certain circumstances, the text of the Convention may
simply hinder the full development of the ECtHR's case law.208 The CJEU
similarly is eager to "set sail from the secure anchorage and protected haven of
'plain words' and to explore the wider seas of purpose and context."209 Both
courts have adopted these interpretations for decades. The ECtHR espoused the
idea of the "living instrument" in the late-1970s. The then-European Court of
Justice embraced its teleological interpretative theory as early as 1963 when it
stated in a seminal opinion that it was "necessary to consider the spirit, the
general scheme," and not just "the wording,"2 10 of a provision when deciding
how to interpret it.
American constitutional law shows that legal reasoning, rather than the
theory of stare decisis alone, is what matters most for the vitality of a legal
tradition that is based on precedent. Some legal doctrines contend that
constitutional law precedents are potentially more flexible than statutory ones,
since the Constitution should be able to adapt to new and unforeseeable
211developments in order to maintain its resilience over the course of generations.
Others maintain that constitutional precedents should remain flexible because
Congress cannot change an incorrect constitutional decision, only the courts
may.212 Although precedent may be considered to be more flexible in the field
of constitutional law than in others, it is certainly not overlooked: the Supreme
206. Andrea Pin, The Costs and Consequences ofIncorrect Citations: European Law in the U.S.
Supreme Court, BROOKLYN INT'L. L. REV. 129, 161 (2016).
207. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, supra note 18, at ¶ 31.
208. KANSTANTIN DZEHTSIAROU, EUROPEAN CONSENSUS AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 203 (2015). More precisely, he stated that the text of the
Convention halts the expansion of conventional rights, which normally happens through the use of
consensus. In determining consensus, the ECtHR examines changes in domestic laws in a relevant field,
from which it may conclude that a consensus among Member States has established the existence of a
new right. Id.
209. Fennelly, supra note 189, at 657.
210. Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1, Judgment, at 12.
211. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 410-411 (1932) (Brandeis, J.) ("In cases
involving the Federal Constitution, the position of this court is unlike that of the highest court of England,
where the policy of stare decisis was formulated and is strictly applied to all classes of cases.") (internal
quotations omitted). See HAROLD J. BERMAN & WILLIAM R. GREINER, THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF
LAW 493 (1966) ("In matters of constitutional law ... the doctrine of precedent has still less value than
in matters of tort law, since it is a function of the courts under our system of law to adapt the provisions
of the Constitution to the changing needs of society.").
212. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989) ("Considerations
of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of
constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what
we have done."); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) ("In constitutional questions, where
correction depends upon amendment and not upon legislative action[,] this Court throughout its history
has freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions."); see also C. Serkin
& N. Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 701, 762 (2016) (discussing the possibility
of construing a Constitution in the least harmful way).
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Court itself has clarified that, in interpreting the Constitution, prior precedents
are key considerations.213 Stare decisis may not be strictly applied, but "[t]his
does not mean that the Constitution has no fixed meaning and that the courts will
overturn previous constitutional decisions whenever they disapprove of them; on
the contrary, the Constitution has an extraordinary stability as a framework. . .
and the Supreme Court of the United States, in interpreting it, is strongly
influenced by its own past decisions."214
Stare decisis can unfold in several alternative ways: it is one thing to freeze
the development of the law into a set of unchangeable precedents; it is another
215
thing to rely on previous decisions to help guide a change of precedent. But
the legal reasoning that normally adopts stare decisis surely refuses to cite
precedents without explaining why and how the case law changes. If, as Duxbury
believes, "precedents are vectors for reason,"2 16 that legal reasoning considers
them-potentially all of them-cheerfully, as they drive arguments and reveal
the intellectual framework within which stare decisis operates.
V. AMICI CURIAE AND THE DUTY To DISCLOSE ADVERSE AUTHORITIES
A. The Transformation ofLitigation and Amici
One of the practices that can interfere with precedent-bound reasoning is
the third-party filing of amicus briefs with the court. "Amicus curiae" in Latin
literally means "friend of the court."217 In Roman law and ancient common law,
it referred to people who were invited or permitted to make observations that
would help the court decide a case.
218
There has been a steady growth of amicus briefs in litigation worldwide.
The practice of filing briefs has been part of strategies of groups, lobbyists, and
stakeholders who, although they do not have vested interests in a specific case,
expect to be affected by it. This concern has also increased the transnational
practice of filing briefs in other jurisdictions, hoping that a decision of a foreign
or supranational court would be favorable for use in domestic litigation.219
International tribunals, alongside domestic courts, are receiving a sizable number
of amici briefs.220 The ECtHR is no exception, as its "number of amicus
participants, as well as amicus briefs, has been growing steadily over the
years."
221
213. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1992) ("We begin, as we do in all
due process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices.").
214. BERMAN & GREINER, supra note 211, at 493.
215. Balcerzak, supra note 74, at 139.
216. DUXBURY, supra note 51, at 152.
217. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (9' ed. 2009).
218. Christopher McCrudden, Transnational Culture Wars, 13 INT'L J. CONST. L. 434, 455
(2015).
219. Id at 442-43 (arguing that "one way of appealing to their domestic audience is for domestic
NGOs to intervene in litigation in foreign courts against policies and practices that are particularly
unpopular in the NGOs' home jurisdiction," and that the ECtHR has similarly served as a transnational
hotspot for new judicial ideas).
220. Id
221. Anna Dolidze, Bridging Comparative and International Law: Amicus Curiae Participation
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The interest in filing a brief as an amicus is particularly understandable in
legal systems that consider precedents binding or authoritative. A judicial
decision to which someone is not a party may establish a precedent that will bind
that person, setting a rule to which that party will need to comply. In fact, the
rule of stare decisis is among the core reasons that have encouraged judges to
accept, or even invite, non-parties to submit their observations.2 22
The more that common-law systems rely on ptecedents, the more potential
that parties in future trials may try to make their argument before a precedent is
established.2 23 This is particularly true with regard to the shifts that common-law
systems like those in the United States and the United Kingdom have
experienced in recent times.224 The courts' role has shifted with increased nation-
wide and constitutional litigation, as the ramifications of their judgments now go
beyond the single dispute that they are asked to assess and resolve. While stare
decisis turns single controversies into cases of utmost importance, it can also
result in the reverse, by mitigating the strength and breadth of precedents
precisely in order not to prejudice further constitutional reflections and
developments in later controversies. It is beyond dispute, however, that the
salience of certain cases invites amici briefs and intervenors more than it did
before.
B. The U.S. Model ofPublic Law Litigation
In a pioneering work in 1976, Professor Abram Chayes noted that U.S.
courts were experiencing a powerful shift in their role, which he called "public
law litigation." 2 2 5 From his perspective, since the late nineteenth century, under
the pressure of "a growing body of legislation designed explicitly to modify and
regulate basic social and economic arrangements,"226, a new model of civil
litigation" was emerging.227 One century later, this model was replacing the
traditional conception of the lawsuit as a "vehicle for settling disputes between
private parties about private rights."228 Professor Chayes observed that the
standard "bipolar," "retrospective" litigation, 229 which consisted of a "self-
contained episode,"230 was collapsing under the pressure of trials that consisted
in the "vindication of constitutional or statutory policies."231 This new judicial
fashion was characterized by the amorphous structure of parties, the fading away
as a Vertical Legal Transplant, 26 EUR. J. INT'L L. 851, 853 (2015).
222. Kermit V. Lipez, SomeReflections on Dissenting, 57 MAINE L. REV. 313, 330 (2005).
223. Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study ofAmici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine
Balance ofAccess, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 THE REV. LITiO. 670, 702 (2008).
224. A thorough reflection on amici curiae has also taken place in Ireland, New Zealand, Canada,
and Australia. See Zeldine O'Brien, The Courts Make a New Friend? Amicus Curiae Jurisdiction in
Ireland, 7 TRINITY COLLEGE L. REV. 5 (2004).
225. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1281 (1976).
226. Id. at 1288.
227. Id at 1282.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1283.
231. Id. at 1284.
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of the "traditional adversary relationship," and the rise of the judge as the
"dominant figure in organizing and guiding the case."232 The judge relied on a
"wide range of outsiders."2 33 Contemporary legal doctrine reveals that Professor
234
Chayes's prophecy has been realized.
This activity has impact beyond the dispute at hand. By establishing a
precedent, cases may provide the general public and governmental institutions
with a certain interpretation of constitutional or statutory texts that indirectly puts
an end to future disputes. The classical model of judges as umpires of single
controversies, making decisions that will affect only parties, does not accurately
portray the actual role that they play. They are concerned with the issue of
getting "the law right," and not simply resolving a dispute.236
In such circumstances, allowing amici to intervene in the proceedings by
submitting briefs helps courts identify issues, explore angles, or shine a light on
contours that are not part of the architecture of the case at hand. It also helps
courts to consider items about which the parties have no knowledge or even
prefer not to bring to the attention of the judge. Amicus briefs are an asset that
the judge utilizes to "inform himself on aspects of the case not adequately
developed by the parties."237 As Professor Linda Sandstrom Simars has
observed, "The emergence of the public law model and its maturation ... created
a ripe environment for interested non-parties to weigh in on the development of
policy through the courts; the amicus brief provided the tool to accomplish this
goal."238
It is no surprise, then, that U.S. appellate courts have been flooded with
amicus briefs, especially since the 1950s, when amici's submissions "played a
critical role in the civil rights litigation." 239 In appellate courts, "the process
reach[ed] beyond the immediate parties to achieve a wider import through the
elaboration of generally applicable rules."240 Amici's attention to superior courts
coheres with such courts' role in overruling precedents and charting new courses
in statutory and constitutional interpretation, and to "[p]ublic law litigation['s]
... call for adequate representation in the proceedings of the range of interests
that will be affected by them."24 1
As a result, "between 1945 and 1995, the number of amicus brief filings
increased by more than 800%, while the numbers of cases decided on the merits
did not increase. Between 1996 and 2003, at least one amicus brief was filed in
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Simard, supra note 223, at 673.
235. Id. at 1294-95 ("We may call this a stare decisis effect, but it is quite different from the
traditional image of autonomous adjustment of individual private transactions in response to judicial
decisions. In cases of this kind, the fundamental conception of litigation as a mechanism for private dispute
settlement is no longer viable.").
236. Helen A. Anderson, Frenemies ofthe Court: The Many Faces ofAmicus Curiae, 49 U. RICH.
L. REV. 361, 406 (2015).
237. Chayes, supra note 225, at 1312.
238. Simard, supra note 223, at 674.
239. Anderson, supra note 236, at 369.
240. Chayes, supra note 225, at 1285.
241. Id. at 1310.
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95% of cases."242 However, after the Supreme Court was flooded with amicus
briefs in one case about abortion,243 its rules were amended to discourage amicus
briefs that do not add anything to the discussion;244 as a matter of fact, however,
the Court still accepts them with a certain largesse.
C. Litigating Human Rights in the Highest British Courts
When the United Kingdom implemented the Human Rights Act in 1998, it
replaced the House of Lords as the highest court with a Supreme Court and
required that the Supreme Court do what is possible to have British law comply
with the European Convention of Human Rights. Basically, that means either a)
giving domestic law an interpretation that does not conflict with the
Convention245 or b) signaling to the Parliament that a domestic statute conflicts
with the Convention, so that the Parliament can amend the legislation to conform
it to the Convention.24 6
These provisions highlighted the role of the Supreme Court as the
adjudicator of human rights.247 Again, this 'role hardly replicates that traditionally
held by common-law courts, be they superior or inferior. Adjudicating human
rights and suggesting that the Parliament amend the existing legislation are types
of activity that touch upon an indefinite series of potential controversies of public
salience. The common law basic framework that sees "two competing legal
interests . . . pitted against each other with a judge charged with deciding in
accordance with existing law which of the two should prevail"248 has become no
longer viable.
English common law does not ignore third parties' interventions. But
amicus briefs traditionally encompassed interventions "in the judicial interest":
such amici "neither advocate[d] in [their] own interest nor represent[ed] the
public interest.'249 The transformation of litigation into a mechanism of human
rights redress has attracted wider interests, and interventions might "even seem.
to threaten the integrity ... of the process."250
After surveying existing data, commentators have concluded that the
242. Anderson, supra note 236, at 369-70 (quoting Omari Scott Simmons, Picking Friends from
the Crowd: Amicus Participation as Political Symbolism, 42 CONN. L. REV. 185, 193 (2009)).
243. S. Chandra Mohan, The Amicus Curiae: Friends No More?, SINGAPORE JLS 352, 370
(2010) ("In 1990, after being overwhelmed with 78 amicus briefs in one abortion rights case, the U.S.
Supreme Court revised its Rule 37[.]").
244. According to Supreme Court Rule 37.1, "An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention
of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help
to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is
not favored."
245. Human Rights Act 1998, c.42, § 3 (Eng.) ("So far as it is possible to do so, primary
legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with
the Convention rights.").
246. Id., § 4 ("If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right,
it may make a declaration of that incompatibility.").
247. Sangeeta Shah et al., Rights, Interveners and the Law Lords, 34 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
295, 295 (2014).
248. Id. at 296.
249. Id. at 297.
250. Id. at 296.
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Human Rights Act has dramatically changed the role of the highest British court.
The Supreme Court has become the target of a sizable number of
interventions,25 1 which have focused on human rights claims, while other types
of controversies seem to be less interesting. There is no clear correlation between
third party interventions and the final outcome of the case, but their advocacy
seems to affect the legal reasoning of a judgment.252
D. Amici's Arguments
The success of amicus briefs reflects the changes in the role of adjudication
of common-law courts. This affirmation holds true both qualitatively and
quantitatively. As stated above, amicus curiae briefs find their roots in the
Roman and English traditions,253 which welcomed the intervention of experts
254
and other figures who could effectively inform the judge. This type of
255 256
nonpartisan help, provided by people unaffected by the facts of the case or
by experts, has never disappeared from the legal scene. But such intervention by
those uninterested in the dispute has become secondary.257 It is more likely that
amici have a specific interest in the judgment-either in its outcome or in its
reasoning. It does not mean that they necessarily support some party, although
using amici to reinforce one's own view is a common tool for litigants 258 of
which courts are deeply aware. Amici may even intervene in support of neither
of the parties, but out of the interest of pushing the judgment in a certain
direction: the public character of litigation cannot but encourage this practice, as
non-parties may legitimately expect to suffer the consequences of a judgment of
a case in which they have no standing to participate, and therefore resort to filing
an amicus brief. They may give "voice to other persons potentially affected by
the suit."259
In doing so, amicus briefs are in a special position during judicial
proceedings.2 Common-law jurisdictions vary in how they treat amicus
261
briefs-U.S. courts tend to welcome them, although some judges have voiced
their skepticism toward the wide recourse of amici that merely duplicate parties'
251. Id. at 302, 311. Third parties' interventions do not fall within the category of amici unless
their participation is solicited by the court itself, so we are not calling them "amici" here.
252. Id. at 318-19.
253. Mohan, supra note 243, at 353-54.
254. Id. at 368 ("[B]y the 13' century the small but active body of early English barristers known
as serjeants-at-law were regularly consulted and were frequently present in court to offer their services . .
.. .".); see Stuart Banner, The Myth of the Neutral Amicus: American Courts and Their Friends, 1790-
1890, 20 CONST. COMM. 111, 111 (2003).
255. Anderson, supra note 236, at 363.
256. Mohan, note 243, at 357.
257. Id. at 363.
258. Id. at 370 (stating that enlisting potential amici has become a valuable skill).
259. Anderson, supra note 236, at 367.
260. Id. at 361 ("[A]mici curiae . .. are not bound by rules of standing and justiciability, or even
rules of evidence . . . .").
261. Id. at 364 ("The Supreme Court of the United States has helped the cause of amicus curiae
considerably with its open door policy for amicus briefs."). Anderson also discusses some substantial
differences between the potential lobbying pressure of amici in state courts, which still accept amici at the
level of last resort. Id. at 365, 397.
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argument, considering them an "abuse."262 In some circumstances, judges have
not allowed amici to support their allegations through evidence263 and have
prevented them from intervening during oral hearings or on matters of fact.2 64
More broadly, courts "have no obligation toward amici: if an amicus brief is not
helpful, the court can simply ignore it." 265
In the United States, fewer privileges come with fewer obligations. Amici
in U.S. courts do not have the obligation to disclose precedents that run against
their arguments. While judges might appreciate the novelty of amici's arguments
266and information, there do not seem to be examples of judges reprimanding
amici who lack a thorough consideration of all relevant precedents within their
submissions. Judges expect amici to see a controversy from a different angle than
267
the parties and will sometimes criticize briefs that add nothing substantial to
issues of which they are already aware.
The special status of amici may also allow them to make arguments that
push the law in a certain direction, also evoking foreign laws and practices 268
order to justify "their law reform efforts." 269 In this respect, they can lobby,
promoting specific legal agendas. Several groups, non-governmental
organizations,270 and associations make their case for legal change through amici
submissions. In contrast, it is no surprise that the frequent amici briefs that are
filed before the ECtHR, which is not precedent-bound, are believed to confirm
the ECtHR's self-understanding "as an institution whose pronouncements would
have policy implications for all of Europe."2 7 1 But the role of amici is unsettling
for common-law courts, whose legal framework is essentially defined by the
existing case law: their lawyers are supposed to keep up with existing laws before
making them evolve.
The practice of accepting amici briefs and the changes in the nature of
common-law litigation transform the spirit and the logic of common law. The
public nature of litigation draws wide attention for specific controversies. As
judgments on statutory or constitutional law have an impact that extends beyond
the parties involved, amici submit arguments to protect themselves from the
consequences of the judgments, and to help establish a precedent hat would be
favorable to them. But in the United States, they can do so without adopting the
262. Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner
J.) (internal citations omitted).
263. Id.
264. O'Brien, supra note 224, at 8 (noting that the Irish Supreme Court accepts only legal
submissions from amici).
265. Anderson, supra note 236, at 364.
266. Id. at 361 ("[A]mici curiae . . . can present the court with new information and arguments .
267. Simard, supra note 223, at 690 (presenting a survey that indicates that "all three levels of
the federal bench find amici curiae helpful in offering new legal arguments that are absent from the parties'
briefs").
268. Shah et al., supra note 247, at 299 ("Third party interventions can be a useful vehicle for
bringing international and comparative materials to the attention of the court.").
269. Id at 362.
270. Id. at 315 ("NGOs are a very big player in human rights cases post-HRA.").
271. Dolidze, supra note 221, at 878.
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basic intellectual framework that dominates common-law logic: namely, making
arguments that incorporate, explain, and develop all the relevant case law that
already exists.
In other words, amicus briefs undercut the adversarial process, not simply
because amici may provide courts with views others than those of the parties but
also because some legal systems allow them to expound their reasonings without
having to address all the relevant decisions. Amici may not add anything
substantial, but they are able to argue without adopting the precedent-bound legal
reasoning.
CONCLUSION: THE UNIVERSAL LESSON OF THE COMMON LAW
The common law has developed a unique pattern of legal reasoning. The
dynamics of common-law systems seem to nurture a respect for the past that
requires parties and judges to consider previous decisions thoroughly,
constraining legal reasoning as well as forging a specific path that all the parties
that participate in a judicial controversy should follow. The narratives about the
past need not be the same-in fact, they are expected to diverge significantly-
but should overlap in their consideration of previous decisions. This approach
272
applies across generations of practicing lawyers as well as jurisdictions.
While a few essential factors-its system of trials and appeals, inherent
ability to manage its caseload, and adversarial system-have shaped the common
law, they do not categorically distinguish the common law from supranational
European systems. The supranational European systems do have a novel type of
structure unique from both domestic and international tribunals that makes them
distinct. It is also true that the European supranational systems have struggled
with caseload management in a way that common-law jurisdictions do not. And
the absence of an adversarial system does indeed affect how the European
supranational jurisdictions understand and consider cases. But those factors are
not the controlling ones that cause the chasm between the common law and
supranational European systems. Indeed, in how it handles its caseload and
considers cases, the ECtHR is more like common-law jurisdictions than the
CJEU is. And yet, the CJEU's decisions have more of a common-law-like
consistency even though the CJEU's unique structural features have no
analogues in common-law jurisdictions. The unique mechanism of "preliminary
rulings" makes the CJEU's opinions precedent for the case at the national level,
and the CJEU's preoccupation with the ordered development of EU law
discourages sharp deviations from previous decisions as well as repeated
requests for preliminary rulings on the same issue.273
There is one main difference that sets common-law systems apart from the
European supranational ones, no matter how superficially similar a judicially
272. See Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012)
(stating that a judge's deferential treatment of precedents "will make no sense unless she expects them to
cooperate in the respecting of expectations - not necessarily by accepting and applying her formulation
as canonical but at least by participating in the creating and sustaining of expectations rooted in decisions
like hers").
273. See infra Section III.B.1-2.
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driven form of reasoning may seem. All of the common-law countries examined
in this article have some form of an ethical rule that requires disclosure of
relevant cases to one degree or another. This shared requirement reveals the
expectation held across these systems that the litigators themselves, and not just
judges, foster precedent-bound thinking. The way parties frame the issues and
incorporate precedent is vital to the courts' adherence to stare decisis because a
court uses the parties' pleadings as the starting point for its analysis. The case is
shaped by the lawyers' decisions regarding which issues to raise and which
decisions to appeal. Since the judge needs to work within parties' arguments,
rather than make determinations about that which is not pleaded, the way lawyers
shape a case before the court has even begun to make its determinations is
essential to the case's outcome. The backward-looking approach is not merely
an option for common law-based systems: it is required by the common law's
own legal reasoning. Former Judge Posner in his personal capacity shows
dissatisfaction about "the backward-looking tendency of legal thinkers,
especially judges;"274 but he acknowledged the importance of that tendency in
his capacity as a judge when he mocked a lawyer for behaving like an ostrich.
The lawyer had breached one of the common law's basic premises, not Judge
Posner's favored legal philosophy.
If no ethics rule requires a similar disclosure, and parties are only required
to submit their arguments, a judge has greater leeway over how to frame
arguments and use precedent. The court is likely to include precedent that grees
with the holding but has no real need to distinguish cases that differ from its
outcome. Even more obviously, a court can ignore controversial decisions that
may weaken the rationale of the new decision when parties are not expecting it
to be addressed.
This striking difference between pan-European adjudication and common-
law systems could also help Europeans identify what they are currently lacking.
Supranational European law has incentivized a sort of judicial activism, which
is rooted in the idea of progress and legal development through the continuous
reinterpretation of the existing body of law. This activism is particularly apparent
in the field of the ECtHR's case law, which has famously espoused the theory
that the Convention it expounds is a "living instrument" that needs adaptation to
the current times.
Because of these courts' philosophical commitment o legal development
through judicial interpretation, the judiciary consistently has been recognized as
European supranational law's main driver.275 Amicus curiae and inspiration from
foreign law have been a trademark of this judicial fashion. This process of legal
development in courtrooms has been the target of increasing dissatisfaction and
274. RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS 401 (2016).
275. For a discussion of the CJEU's influence, see Mark Dawson, The Political Face ofJudicial
Activism: Europe 's Law-Politics Imbalance, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
19 (Mark Dawson et al. eds., 2013). As for the ECtHR's effect on the development of supranational aw,
see Kai M611er, From Constitutional to Human Rights: On the Moral Structure ofInternational Human
Rights, 3 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 373, 398 (2014) (defining the ECtHR as "the poster child of
international human rights law").
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skepticism, however, from both a theoretical and a practical point of view.276
From a theoretical perspective, some have maintained that it would be
inappropriate for a court to modernize the interpretation of written provisions
without political consent.277 From a practical one, this type of development is
considered ambiguous, incoherent, and largely unpredictable.278
The practical criticisms reach the core of the common-law legacy. They
oftentimes have specifically targeted how European law has manipulated
previous decisions.279 For a constitutional-style body of law that develops
incrementally through judicial decisions,. it seems necessary to maintain a
transparent legal reasoning that departs from existing case law for substantial
and explicit reasons. That is what seems to happen at first sight, as supranational
courts now cite precedents routinely and abundantly. But supranational
European law is still criticized for being "arcane," for being deprived of clarity,
and for blending holdings and dicta with imprecision. 280 It fails to both
distinguish and overrule cases explicitly.
These flaws do not result from the lack of a rigid stare decisis. Rather they
are products of the absence of one of the essential features of common law: a
legal reasoning that works by addressing previous decisions instead of merely
citing favorable ones. This absence cannot be compensated by merely
implementing rules that require parties to cite all relevant precedents within their
argument. Lawyers alone cannot correct a court's reasoning that is inattentive in
how it cites previous judgments. Instead, a court may push parties to be more
attentive to precedent in their pleadings by crafting decisions that closely
examine its case law and try to incorporate all relevant cases, rather than
selectively choosing them based on outcome.
A pattern of legal reasoning more concerned with the past may slow the
development of law. But that is not a given. Instead of limiting development, this
reasoning through enhancing the consistency of case law and disciplining legal
reasoning itself may invite it. The ECtHR's evolutionary jurisprudence
exemplifies this dynamic adequately. The ECtHR's legal development is
undisciplined and lacks adequate justification because of its weak culture of
precedent. It therefore fails to support its evolutive case law with adequate
276. John Finnis, Judicial Law-Making and the 'Living' Instrumentalisation of the ECHR, in
LORD SUMPTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 82 (Nicholas Barber, Richard Ekins & Paul Yowell eds.,
2016) (contending that the ECtHR's expansive approach to some of the Convention's clauses "has become
philosophically and juridically indefensible").
277. Heydon, supra note 23, at 399 (arguing that the ECtHR's pattern of reasoning would be
proper for a legislature).
278. Id. at 404.
279. The ECtHR's process of creating general principles has sparked special controversy. See
Gerards, supra note 15, at 64-65 (internal quotations omitted). Gerards argues that:
[The ECtHR] usually builds on previous case-law, drawing together small pieces of
argumentation that it has previously provided, and combining them into a set of general
principles or criteria .... Although the result ofthis approach may be a rather 'deep' definition,
the Court tends to stress that this is the unavoidable outcome of small definitional steps taken
in previous cases. Mostly, moreover, the definitions are given at such a high level of
abstraction and generality that it would be difficult to disagree with them.
Id.
280. Heydon, supra note 23, at 404.
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justification. Its decisions "conflict among themselves" and "are full of dicta."281
Courts that care about precedent normally draw sharp distinctions between
holding and dicta because it allows them to limit the scope of prior udgments2 82
and develop the law without creating conflicting lines of case-law.
Finally, a precedent-considering approach can protect courts from the
accusation that they legislate from the bench. A legal analysis that considers and
thoroughly tries to make sense of previous decisions will cause less controversy
than one that creates narratives of the past by highlighting some judgments while
overlooking others in order to reach a certain outcome. Harold Berman identified
the demise of a "belief in the organic development of law over generations and
centuries" in the widespread opinion that expounding the law is just a means to
"effecting the will of those who exercise political authority."2 84 Courts that want
to avoid the risk of politicizing the law should be open to discussing controversial
past judgments rather than selectively avoiding them.
281. Id.
282. Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the Second-Best World, 103 CALIF. L. REv. 1139, 1143
(2015) ("Before a court considers whether a precedent should be overruled, it must determine whether the
precedent applies to the case at hand. That inquiry is one of precedential scope . . . .").
283. CHAIM PERELMAN, JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT 40 (1980) ("[T]he common-law judge,
who seems to be bound by precedents. . .has nevertheless been able to escape from the excessive rigidity
that generates injustice by limiting the scope of precedents to the ratio decidendi, which he then defines
in his own way, introducing distinctions whenever they are deemed necessary.").
284. Berman, supra note 1, at 255.
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